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ABSTRACT 
Business cycle properties under different monetary policy rules are 
examined in a variety of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models 
(the real business cycle models, the nominal wage contract models with 
different length of contracts, and the monopolistic competition models 
with different size of price adjustment costs). The experiments show that 
nominal and real features of business cycles are substantially different 
under different monetary policy rules. In particular, the business cycle 
properties under the AR-l rule is substantially different from the business 
cycle properties under the realistic monetary policy rule estimated from 
data, allowing endogenous reactions to the state of economy. Regarding 
the real features of business cycles, the changes under different monetary 
policy rules are as large as the changes generated. from introducing 
rigidities themselves and monetary disturbances. Other experiments show 
that the presence of the nominal liquidity effect may critically depend on 
the specification of monetary policy rules and that movements of real 
variables can be substantially different under different monetary policy 
rules even in the case of small nominal rigidities (or small real effects of 
monetary policy shocks). These results suggest that incorporating the 
realistic monetary policy rule is important for monetary business cycle 
research and that the monetary authority has the potential to affect real 
economy substantially by adopting different monetary policy rules. 

1. Introduction 
This paper examines the role of monetary policy rules in business cycles, or the effects 
of different monetary policy rules on business cycle properties. This research is motivated by the 
trend that very few works systematically investigate the effects of different monetary policy rul(:s 
on business cycle properties within the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 
even though there have been a wealth of research introducing monetary (policy) disturbances 10 
DSGE models with simple monetary policy rules or investigating the effects of monetary (policy) 
disturbances. 
Most past studies introducing money to DSGE models to explain business cycles ha\e 
specified simple monetary policy rules. Most common specification is the AR·I money grow1h 
rate rule (or AR-I log of money growth rate rule) with monetary disturbances, for example, 
Cooley and Hansen [ 1989,1995]. Cho and Cooley [ 1 995] and Christiano and Eichenbaum 
[ 1992]. 
Exceptions within the DSGE models are Leeper and Sims [ 1 994], Rotemberg and Woodford 
[ 1997] and Gavin and Kydland [ 1995]. Leeper and Sims [ 1994] introduced and estimated more 
complicate but more realistic monetary policy rules. Gavin and Kydland [ 1996J suggested that 
different monetary policy rules generate different nominal features of business cycles (variances 
of nominal variables and covariances between nominal variables and real variables).1 
Outside DSGE business cycle models, there has been more realistic consideration of 
monetary policy rules. One is VAR literature that tries to identify monetary policy shocks.2 
These studies specified and estimated more realistic monetary policy rules but most of them 
studied the effects of monetary policy disturbances on business cycles. Some research in V AR 
literature, for example, Sims and Zha [1995] and Kim [ 1995]. and some studies using aggregate 
models, for example, Talyor [ 1 993], studies in Bryant, Hooper, and Mann [ 1993], and Fuhrer and 
Moore [ 1995] examined the effects of different monetary policy rules and regimes. But those 
models are not constructed with full microfoundations and they examined some limited features 
of business cycles. 
I There are other studies assuming a more sophisticated rule than the simple AR-I rule. J.Kim [1996], King 
and Watson [1996]. and Yun [1996] incorporated some aspects of endogeneity of money. But it seems 
difficult to interpret them as an approximation to the monetary authority's stabilization behavior. 
2 See Leeper, Sims, and Zha [1996] for the summary of the literature. 
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Another related research is the theoretical literature comparing different monetary policy 
rules, especially the fixed money ,rule and the fixed interest rate rule.3 But these studies assumed 
relatively simple structure of models or did not systematically examine business cycle properties 
by concentrating on welfare comparison. 
In this paper, I systematically examine the effects of different monetary policy rules on 
business cycles by constructing a variety of the DSGE models. A general question explored is 
how large is the effects of monetary policy rules on business cycles. A specific question explored 
is how good simple exogenous specification of monetary policy rules assumed by previous 
studies, such as the AR-l money growth rate rule with monetary disturbances. are as 
approximations or how important it is to incorporate a realistic monetary policy rule. 
First, I examine the effects of monetary policy rule on the real properties of business 
cycles. One difficulty of current analysis is that we do not have consensus on the nature and the 
size of nominal rigidities. So, I construct several DSGE models in which the nature and the size 
of nominal rigidities are different. The two sources of nominal rigidities are considered: the 
nominal wage contract and the price adjustment costs (menu costs) under the monopolistic 
competition setup. These two sources of real effects of money have been most common ways to 
introduce nominal rigidities.4 For the nominal wage contract model, I consider two cases, one­
period and multi-period nominal wage contracts to examine the robustness of results under 
different length of nominal rigidity. For the monopolistic competition model with price 
adjustment costs, I consider three different sizes of price adjustment costs to examine the 
robustness of results under different sizes of nominal rigidity. In addition, I construct a model in 
which these two sources of nominal rigidities coexist to examine the robustness of results under 
mUltiple sources of nominal rigidities.s 
Still the difficulty of analysis is that the magnitude of the effects of monetary policy 
rules on business cycles is likely to be different depending on the magnitude of rigidity, on which 
we do not have consensus, either. As a way to have a rough idea on the effects, I compare the 
changes in business cycle properties under different monetary policy rules with the changes in 
business cycle properties when we introduce nominal rigidities themselves (and monetary policy 
1 For example, Poole [1970] and Sargent and Wallace [1975,1982]. More recently, Aiyagari and Braun 
[1996], Carlstrom and Fuerst [1995], Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum [1995], and Kim [1996] 
• For example, Cho and Cooley [I995] and Hairault and Portier [1995]. Another popular model is the 
"liquidity model" as in Lucas [19901. Fuerst [1992], and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [\995]. \ plan 
to include this model in future work. 
S Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1997a] suggested that the model with these two sources of nominal 
ngidities may produce more reasonable responses to monetary policy shocks. 
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disturbances) in the model. This comparison seems meaningful since previous researchers 
introduced nominal rigidities (and monetary policy disturbances) to generate different features of 
business cycles (which are claimed to be closer to the data), compared to those from the model 
without money and nominal rigidities. If the changes in business cycle properties under different 
monetary policy rules are as large as those generated from introducing nominal rigidities, 
specifying realistic monetary policy rule may be as important as introducing nominal rigidities. 
Regarding the policy rule experiments, in addition to the hypothetical monetary policy 
rules with realistic parameterization, I also consider monetary policy rule, which is estimated 
from data. For this purpose, 1 construct a simplified version of identified V AR models folbwing 
Sims and Zha [1995] and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1996]. As emphasized by Leeper, 
Sims, and Zha [1996], one of the main achievement of the "identified V AR" literature on 
identifying monetary policy shocks is the finding of large endogenous reactions of the monetary 
authority to the state of the economy. Though far simpler than their models, 1 try to capture some 
systematic endogenous reactions of the monetary authority to the state of the economy using 
identified V AR models. Using these estimated monetary policy rules, the direct comparison is 
possible between the business cycle properties under the AR-l rule and those under the more 
realistic monetary policy rule estimated from data.6 
I also examine the nominal properties of business cycles under different monetary policy 
rules. As suggested by Gavin and Kydland [1996], monetary policy rules can dramatically affect 
the nominal features of business cycles. They showed this result using a model where there are 
6 In principle, it would be better to Gointly) estimate the whole structure of the model as in Leeper and Sims 
[1994] and Rotemberg and Woodford [1997] or at least to specify some consistent underlying process for 
the shocks as in Yun [1996] and King and Watson [1996]. That is, one possible problem is the 
inconsistency between the identified VAR model used to estimate the monetary policy rule and the DSGE 
model specifying other structure. One excuse is that we can consider variety of more sophisticated DSGE 
models (which we do not have any consensus) without spending too much time on estimation (in contrast to 
Leeper and Sims [1994]) and without too much simplifying the DSGE model (in contrast to Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1996]) and without too much simplifying the monetary policy rule (in contrast to Yun [1996]). I 
plan to include some experiments which is more consistent. 
In most part of the paper, I do not pursue the line of investigation on whether incorporating 
realistic monetary policy rules can improve the data matching ability of the model or on which model can 
match the data better since current DSGE monetary business cycle models' overall data matching ability is 
poor as suggested in King and Watson [1996]. 
Another issue, which should be discussed, is the definition of the exogenous specification of 
monetary policy rule. 1 define the exogenous specification of monetary policy rules as the monetary policy 
rule which does not react to anything but its own past values (especially not react to other structural shocks). 
Related to the discussion of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1997b], we may specify a realistic 
monetary policy rule using its own variables and other structural shocks without using any endogenous 
variables. 
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no nominal rigidities with hypothetical monetary policy rules. Here, I also consider models with 
nominal rigidities mentioned earlier and my experiments also consider monetary policy rules 
e.itimated from data. 
Finally, I discuss some related issues on the effects of monetary policy. The first one is 
related to the "liquidity effect." It is shown that the postulated monetary policy rule may be 
cl;tical in deciding the presence of the nominal liquidity effect in some cases. Second, it is 
suggested that real properties of business cycles under some monetary policy rules could be 
substantially different even when the effects of monetary policy shocks (or the source of nominal 
rigidities in the conventional sense) are small. 
In Section 2, I construct a variety of DSGE models with different sources and sizes of 
nominal rigidities. In Section 3, I explain monetary policy rules to be considered. In Section 4, I 
examine the changes in the real properties of business cycles under different monetary policy 
ndes when the productivity shocks are the only disturbances in the economy. In Section 5, I 
e)(tend the analysis to the cases in which monetary policy shocks are introduced. In Section 6, I 
examine the nominal features of business cycles under different monetary policy rules. In Section 
7, I discuss some related issues on the effects of monetary policy rules on the business cycles. In 
Section 8, I summarize the results and conclude. 
2. Models 
2.1. CommoD Features ofthe Model 
The following money demand, money supply equations (the monetary policy rule), the 
guvemment budget constraint, and the fiscal policy are common features of all models to be 
considered. 
2.1.1. MODetary Policy Rule 
I assume the following monetary policy rule. 
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ah 10g�+aR 10g(1 +r1) = logao +ahl log MI_1 +aR110g(1 +rl_l) 
M,_, M,_. 
(2_1)+a .. log � +a""log PI-I +ay logY; +ayllogYt_1 
PI-I PI-2 
Y Y 
+ ayy 10g -'- + ayy110g----.!=!... + logcht 
YI-l Y'-2 
where logcht is an i.i.d. N(O,O'h) process. r will give more explanations on monetary policy rules 
in Section 3. 
2.1.2. Money Demand 
Instead of deriving money demand exp licitly , I postulate the following money demand 
equation. 
(2.2) logM, -logP, = y.logY , +y, log(i + r, ) +y, 
where M. is the money stock. PI the price level, YI real income, rl the nominal interest rate, 1c the 
elasticity of real money balance with respect to income, and 'YR the semi-elasticity of real money 
balance with respect to the nominal interest rate.1v > 0 and 1R < O. 
By assuming money demand function, we can allow the classical dichotomy in the model 
without nominal rigidities. So, when we introduce a nominal rigidity, all real effects of money 
are generated from the nominal rigidity. Thus, it helps more clear understanding on the 
consequence of introducing the nominal rigidity in the model. King and Watson [1996] used a 
similar strategy.1 
2.1.3. Government Budget Constraint and Fiscal Policy 
1 Another reason of postulating the money demand equation instead of deriving it is that the difference in 
the specific functional fonn and parameterization of money demand, which may be resulted from different 
way of introducing money in the model. may affect the business cycle properties. I plan to examine this 
issue in the future work. For the results from the transaction cost model, see the previous version of this 
paper. 
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The following government budget constraint and fiscal policy are used for all models. 
The government budget constraint is: 
(2.3) 
So, the government finances the total nominal debt (�.lBt.l+Mt.l) by issuing new nominal debt 
(Mt+Bt) and collecting lump-sum tax (Pttt). For simplicity, fiscal policy is assumed as Bt=O.· 
2.2. Real Business Cycle Models 
In this model, there are no nominal rigidities, and money does not have any real effects. 
The real side of the model is one of the standard models in the Real Business Cycle literature, for 
oX>.'11ple, King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and Cooley and Prescott (1995).1 present the model 
with nominal variables to be consistent with the notation of the models with nominal rigidities. 
The representative household is endowed each period with one unit of time, which he 
divides between leisure (I -L.) and work (L.). He maximizes his expected lifetime utility subject 
to his intertemporal budget constraints and the capital stock accumulation technology. There are 
several �ources of income - wage income (WtL/P[ where Wt is nominal wage and Pt is the price 
level), rental income (SotKc where Sot is real rental rate and Kt is capital stock), a constant share of 
profits from the finn (P�), gross interest income from government bond holdings «(I +rt.I)BI.dPI), 
where rt.1 is the nominal interest rate of the bonds. He allocates his income to consumption (et), 
investment (Ia), changes in money holdings «Mt-Mt.')/Pt), government tax (tl), and new purchase 
of government bonds (B/PJ. The capital stock evolves as the net result of investment and 
depreciation (one-period time to build). Thus, each representative household solves the following 
problem. 
max E.[fp'u(C"I-L,)]=E.[fp, C,'--(I-L,l"]'-' s.t. 1("K,.1,,8,) /.0 , .. 0 I-a 
• There is no loss of generality of this assumption since I am considering only "active monetary" . passive 
fiscal" regime (on which conventional analysis is based) where the Ricardian Equivalence holds. See 
Cooley and Hansen [1995] pp. 197. Also refer to the next footnote. 
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(2.4) 
(2.5) 
The first order conditions are: 
(2.6) 
dU(C"I- L,) 
dC, 
(2.7) 
dU(C"I- L,) 
dL, 
(2.8) A, = PE,Q,., 
A, 
A W, , P, 
(2.9) Q, =p(l-o)E,Q .. , +s,A, 
(2.10) � = {JR,E, [A,., ] 
PI PI.) 
Note that Me is determined from pre-specified money demand and money supply equation, so Me 
is not a choice variable in this problem. 
The representative finn maximizes its profits (PRt) subject to the production technology. 
max PRlo s.t. 
(2.11) 
' ( ' )'-' (2.12) Y, = z,K, g L, 
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"here Z is the steady state value of� (the technology shock), &lJ is an i.i.d N(O,oz) process, and 
g is the steady state growth rate. 
The first order conditions are: 
(2.14) W'=z,(I- i�) 'g' 
P, \g L, 
� )'-' 
(2.15) s, =z, � 
giLl 
2.3. Model with Nominal Wage Contract 
In this model, the structure of previous models remains except for the component of pre­
determined nominal wage contract. Nominal wage is pre-detennined. and this is the source of 
real effects of money. The structure of the model is similar to Cho and Phaneuf [1993] and 
Bergin [1996] in that the supply side of the labor market set the predetermined wage. Cho and 
Cooley [1995] and King [1992] also exploit the pre-determined wage setting. 
2.3.1. One-Period Nominal Wage Contract 
I assume that the nominal wage is pre-determined and the equilibrium quantity in the 
labor market is demand determined. 1 assume that at time t, the nominal wage for time t+l is set 
as the rational expectation of the wage that would prevail at time t+ I if the wage is determined in 
the spot market. These imply substituting the previous labor supply equation (2.7) by the 
following equation. 
(2 16) W =E 
[dU(C"I-L,)P, ] 
I 1-1 dL, AI 
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2.3.2. Multi-Period Nominal Contract 
Similarly, I assume that the nominal wage is pre-detennined and the equilibrium quantily 
in the labor market is demand detennined. I assume that at time 1, the nominal wages for 1, t+l. 
t+2, t+ 3 are set as the rational expectation of the wage that would prevail at those days if tre 
wage is determined in the spot market. which implies the following equations. 
(2.17) W. =E[dU(C,.;.I-L,.JP,.,] �+'.� I dL,.; A�.; 
where i = 0, 1 , 2, and 3 and W�+; I is the wage at time t+i set at time t. 
In addition, I assume staggered contracts in which each period one of four contracting 
groups sets its four-quarter contract. And the overall wage level is approximated by the average 
over the contract levels of the four groups. 
(2.18) w, = t, ±(W, ..J 
2.4. Monopolistic Competition Model witb Price Adjustment Costs 
Next model introduces price adjustment costs as the source of nominal rigidity. For tf'>e 
finn to be able to set up the price, the structure of monopolistic competition is assumed. 
Following Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987J and Hairault and Portier [ 1 993J. 1 assume CES basket 
of the different goods and define appropriate price index. Then, household problem can be 
described as before. The j th finn maximizes its value, which is the expectation of the discounted 
sum of its profit flows. The variables with subscript j imply the variables specific to the j th finn. 
max PR jO = Eo[f p, PR,,] 
,.0 
s.t. 
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(219) 
(2.20) 
PR = _P_it Vit _ s K _ _ W_,_L_Jl _ AC jt PI t I PI )1 
(2.22) AC = ¢>, [-2_ 1:]' y. 
JI 2 P Jl jt-! g 
The equation (2.19) defines the profit where AC is the adjustment cost. The equation (2.20) is 
the demand function that the finn j faces, where J is the total number of firms and e� is the price 
elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist. The equation (2.21) describes the production 
function, where <l> is the fixed cost component, which allows the firms to earn zero profit in the 
long run. The equation (2.22) defines the adjustment cost as a convex function of deviation from 
the steady state, where 1.1 is the steady state growth rate of money and �g is the steady state 
inflation rate. The finn discount factor is given by a stochastic process { PI }, which represents a 
pricing kernel for contingent claims in the equilibrium. 
The set of technological restrictions and first order conditions at the aggregate level (by 
dropping the index of the firm, j) are: 
'(' y-' , (2.23) Y, = z,K, g L, - <!Jg 
(2.25) 
- 14 -
(2.26) aW,L, = (l-a}s,K, 
(2.27) s,K, = a (y , + <l>g' {I-
e
l
� 
) 
(2.28) e� =1J,(I-¢p(�-E..)�J+P¢pE,[�(P,., _E..Xp,·,)'] �_I g P'-I A, � g P, 
where eY is the output demand elasticity augmented with the adjustment cost. 
2.S. Monopolistic Competition Model with Price Adjustment Costs and Nominal Wal!e 
Contract 
I also consider another model where the previous two sources of nominal rigidities 
coexist. I use the structure of the previous monopolistic competition model with price adjustment 
costs. To incorporate the one-period nominal wage contract, I replace the labor sUFply equation 
(2.7) with (2.16). 
2.6. Calibration and Solution Method 
Each variable is transfonned to real variables and transformed to stationary variables. 
Then, the system is linearized around the steady state. After the steady state parameters are 
calibrated, the system is expressed as a first order V AR process without expectational terms 
following Sims [1995].9 Impulse responses and Hodrick-Prescott Filtered Population Moments 
are obtained analytically. 
9 For some parameter regions of monetary policy rules, a unique solution cannot be obtained. I exclude 
those policy rules in my experiments. The estimated monetary policy rules also produce a unique 
equilibrium. And, by the specification of fiscal rules in my model, I am experimenting the parameter region 
where monetary policy is "active" and fiscal policy is "passive." (See Leeper [1991J). The possibility of 
moving to the other region where monetary policy is passive and fiscal policy is active (See Leeper [\993]) 
and the possibility of other parameter region where there are sunspot equilibria or no solution may be 
another way that monetary policy may have great effects on the economy. 
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Parameter values for calibration are chosen so that the steady state values match 
estimates of average growth rates and specific "great ratios" calculated from the postwar data. 
Specifically, parameter values (quarterly values) are chosen so that in steady state, 0 = .025, e = 
.42, Rht = ( 1 .065}2s, and I = .2, following King, Plosser and Rebelo [1 988] and King and 
Watson [1996]. In addition, parameter values implies that 1t = ( 1 .04) 2S Parameters for 
productivity shocks, Pp is set to .95. Elasticity of real money balance with respect to consumption 
i$ set to 1 (Yy=I), which is the long-run elasticity found in Lucas (1988) and Stock and Watson 
(1993] and used by King and Watson [1996]. The semi-elasticity of real money balance with 
respect to the nominal interest rate seems more controversiaL The long-run elasticity found in 
Lucas [1988] and Stock and Watson [1993] is .1. In contrast, Taylor [1993] found larger 
estimates, .22 of short-run elasticity and 4.73 of long-run elasticity. I used . 1 .  Under different 
monetary policy rules, in each model, changing the constant term in monetary policy rule 
preserves the same steady state. For the model of monopolistic competition with price' adjustment 
costs, additional parameterization is needed. Following Hairault and Portier [1993], ey is set to 
1.197/0.197. Following Rotemberg and Woodford [1995]. long run zero profit conditions are 
imposed. The adjustment cost parameter $p is set to 0, 1 , 5, or 1 5. For utility function, 0=1 is 
aisumed. 
3. Monetary Policy Rules 
In this section, I discuss different monetary policy rules to be experimented. I discuss 
those rules in relation to the past literature. I rewrite the equation (2.1) again. 
The above rule and the following rule, which looks more intuitive, have the same implications on 
the equilibrium of the linearized system that will be analyzed. 
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where H, =M,IMH, 7r1=P/PH, Ylg1=yl, ah =ah, ahl =ahl, aR = aRH , 
Therefore, the monetary authority is assumed to follow a feedback rule. The monetary 
authority sets money growth rate (ah) (or interest rate (aR) or combination of money growth rale 
and interest rate (ah and aR) in reactions to current and past inflation rate, current and past 
growth rate of output, current and past level of output, past groYith rate of money (current rale 
also if interest rate setting rule), and past interest rate (current value also if money growth rate 
setting rule).1011 
3.1. Exogenous Monetary Policy Rule 
In the previous literature, the exogenous specification of monetary policy rules is often 
postulated. In the literature using theoretical models to explore the effects of monetary policy 
analytically (or in the simple textbook version of monetary policy specification), one of the 
common specification is the fixed money growth rate rule (ah and a.o are non-zero constants and 
other a's are zero) In the business cycle models with money, the most common specification IS 
the AR-l money growth rate rule (ah, ahl> and a.o are non-zero constants and other a's are zero), 
for example, -Cooley and Hansen (1989,1995) In the experiments for the models with only 
10 The an alysis can be extended to the feedback rule including higher lags. Here, I allow just one lag for 
simplicity. 
II I consider a money growth rate setting rule instead of the level of money setting rule following the 
tradition within dynamic general equilibrium models, for example, Sargent and Wallace [1982]. In most 
cases, I consider a money growth rate setting rule instead of an interest rate setting rule to provide direct 
comparison with commonly specified monetary policy rules in the literature, for example, the AR-J money 
growth rate rule or the fixed money growth rate rule. 
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productivity shocks, I use the fixed money growth rate rule as the benchmark case. In the 
experiments for the models with both productivity shocks and monetary policy shocks, I use the 
AR-1 money growth rate rule as the benchmark case. 
For the AR-1 money growth rate rule, for the period of 60:1 - 96:4 in the U.S., the 
estimates of AR-1 coefficient are .65, .69, and .72 for MI, M2, and total reserves, respectively. 
The positive AR-I coefficient is also robust for Hodrick-Prescott Filtering. For the filtered 
growth rate, the estimates are .4 1 ,  .45, and .38. for MI, M2, and total reserves, respectively. 
Cooley and Hansen [1995] used this rule with AR-cOefficient .49 1 ,  Cooley and Hansen [1989] 
with .481 , and Cho and Cooley (1995] with .48. I use .41, the estimate from HP-filtered M I 
growth rate.12 
3.2. Hypotbetical Feedback Monetary Policy Rules 
Though most past researchers have used the exogenous specification of monetary policy 
rules, there has been substantial documentation that monetary authority reacts to the state of the 
economy to stabilize the economic fluctuations. So, I consider some hypothetical counter­
cyclical, counter-inflation policy rules. I consider a counter cyclical policy with a.yy = -I, a 
counter inflation policy with a" = -.9, and a counter cyclical-counter inflation policy with a.yy ""­
.5 and a,. = -.5. I also consider a pro-cyclical policy with O-yy = 1. 
3.3. Estimated Monetary Policy Rules 
In addition to hypothetical counter-cyclical and counter-inflation monetary policy rules, I 
consider the monetary policy rules estimated from data. I follow the V AR literature identifying 
monetary policy shocks. I simplify the models of Sims and Zha [1995] and Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans [ 1996]. 
I include four variables in the V AR system - treasury bill rate (TBR), M I growth rate 
(\llg), real GNP growth rate (RGNPg), GNP deflator growth rate (PGNPg). I used only one-lag. 
The estimation period is from 1960-1996 using US quarterly data.13 
Another reason I used money growth rate setting rule instead of interest rate setting rule is that the 
fIxed intereSI rate rule generates indeterminacy problem under Ihe commonly specified fiscal regime and it 
i� difficult to use it as a benchmark case. I plan to consider interest rale setting rule in the future work. II: I also report the estimates of the standard deviation of monetary policy shocks ( O"h ) from the AR-I rule. 
The estimates are .0081, .0061, and .0047 for non-H-p·filtered MI, M2, and MB. respectively. For H-P 
filtered series, they are .0075, .0045, and .0038, respectively. I used .0075. 
I) I used HP-filtered data. 
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The first one is a simplified and modified version of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
[1996} (the CEE rule), I used a.recursive system where the ordering is RGNPg, PGNPg, M g, 
and TBR. That is, monetary authority is assumed to set current Mig after observing current and 
lagged RGNPg, PGNPg and lagged MIg and TBR. The other one is a simplified and modified 
version of Sims and Zha [1995] (the SZ rule), monetary authority is assumed to set current MIg 
after observing current and lagged TBR and lagged RGNPg, PGNPg, and MIg. For the other 
structures of the SZ, PGNPg and RGNPg equations are assumed to a block, which is 
contemporaneously exogenous to other variables, and TBR equation is assumed to include all 
variables contemporaneously, 14 
The estimated parameters for the CEE rule is: 
MIg. -.000061 -.15 PGNPg. + .019 RGNPg. 
- .32 TBR,., + .21 MIg.., - .090 PGNPg..,- .16 RGNPg.." crh�.0071 
The estimated parameters for the SZ rule is: 
MIg. .000022 -.051 TBR, 
-.34 TBR,., +.21 MIg.., -.070 PGNPg.., - .18 RGNPg.." crh�.0066 
Since some previous research suggested that the monetary policy rules for the period 
before the October 1979 and after the October 1979 are different, I also estimate for the period of 
79:4 - 96:4. The estimated parameters for the CEE rule is: 
MIg. -.000023 +.38 PGNPg, + .10 RGNPg, 
-.40 TBR,., + .19 MIg,., - .068 PGNPg,., - .27 RGNPg,." crh�·0081 
The estimated parameters for the SZ rule is : 
MIg, -.000046 +.20 TBR, 
-.24 TBR,., + .21 MIg,., + .21 PGNPg,., - .27 RGNPg,." crh�·0081 
14 The implications are the same when the interest rate sening rule instead of the money growth rate sening 
rule is postulated for the SZ rule. 
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4. Effe<:ts of Mooetary Policy Rules 00 tbe Real Properties of Business Cycles: Productivity 
Shocks 
In this section, I examine the effects of monetary policy rules in the simplest 
environment where the only disturbances in the economy are productivity shocks. The 
benchmark monetary policy rule for comparison is the fixed money growth rate rule. I consider 
different feedback rules on the growth rate of output and inflation rate. 
First I report the real properties of business cycles for the U.S. in Table I. As suggested 
b)' many researchers, investment is more volatile than GNP, working hours, and wage while 
consumption is less volatile than GNP. These variables are highly pro-cyclical and highly 
persistent. 
In Table 2, 1 report the business cycle properties of the different models under the 
constant money growth rate rule. I consider eight different models - the real business cycle 
model (RBC), the one-period nominal wage contract model (NWC-I), the multi-period nominal 
wage contract model (NWC-M), the monopolistic competition models without price adjustn ents 
cost (MC-O) and with price adjustment costs of $,-1,5, and 15 (MC-I, MC-5, and MC-15, 
respectively) and with price adjustment costs of $p= 5 and one period nominal wage contract 
(MC-5-NWC-1 ). 
These models can reproduce some important real features of business cycles. These 
models generate pro-cyclical and highly persistent behavior of each variable. These models can 
reproduce the rankings of relative volatility - investment is more volatile than output and other 
variables are less volatile than output.1S In details, these models produce somewhat different 
properties of business cycles. For example, when the nominal rigidities are introduced, volatility 
of investmen� outpu� consumption decreases (compare (I) with (2) and (3), and (4) with (5), (6), 
(7), and (8». We can see this property more clearly in (1) of Tables 3 and 4. Here, I do not 
pursue further analysis on the relative successes and failures of these models. 
In Tables 3 and 4, I report the changes in population moments under different monetary 
policy rules. I consider feedback rules on growth rate of output and inflation rate. First, I 
consider a counter-cyclical policy (ah=l ,  Oyy=-I) that increases I % in growth rate of money from 
its steady state in response to I % decrease in output growth rate from its steady state. «2) in 
Tables 3 and 4) Second, I consider a pro-cyclical policy (ah= l, Oyy""l) that de.creases 1% in 
growth rate of money in response to 1% decrease in output growth rate from its steady state «3) 
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in Tables 3 and 4). This monetary policy rule may be interpreted as a monetary accommodation 
to cyclical behavior of output to stabilize inflation under productivity shocks. When there is a 
negative productivity shocks, by decreasing money growth rate, the monetary authority can 
stabilize the inflation from the negative productivity shocks. Third, I consider a counter-inflation 
policy (Clt!=I, cx..=-.9) that decreases 1% in growth rate of money in response to .9% increase in 
inflation rate from its steady state «4) in Tables 3 and 4). 
I also report the changes in business cycle properties when we introduce nominal 
rigidities under the constant growth rate rule to have some idea on the size of the changes in 
business cycles under different monetary policy rules « I )  in Tables 3 and 4) Note that the 
changes are compared to the model without nominal rigidities under the same monetary policy 
rule (the constant money growth rate rule). For example, two nominal wage contract models are 
compared to the RBC model and the monopolistic competition models with price adjustment 
costs (+p= l ,  5, and 15) and the MC-S-NWC-I model are compared to the monopolistic 
competition model without price adjustment costs (+p=O). 
In most cases, we can find some changes in standard deviation of each variable. 
Sometimes, the changes are substantial and even the ranking of volatility changes. ('.' represents 
the change in ranking.) We can also find some changes in the correlation structure. 
The changes in business cycle properties under different rules are considerable. In the 
cases of the counter-cyclical policy and counter-inflation policy, we find relatively small changes 
in business cycle properties. Even in this case, we cannot say that it is of a second-order 
importance compared to the changes generated from introducing nominal rigidities. In the case of 
the accommodative inflation-stabilizing policy, the changes in the business cycle properties 
under different monetary policy rules are as large as the changes generated from introducing 
nominal rigidities. In the case of nominal wage contract models, the changes are even larger. In 
the case of monopolistic competition models, we can find a similar size of the changes. 
We can find one interesting pattern of the sign changes. In the case of the inflation­
stabilizing accommodative policy and the counter-inflation policy, the direction of the changes is 
the opposite to those generated from introducing nominal rigidities in most cases. That is, the 
numbers in (I) have the opposite signs of the numbers in (3) and (4). In contrast, in the case of 
counter cyclical policy, we do not find this tendency, and rather, the direction of the changes is 
similar. 
IS The exception is the Me-IS model for the labor movements. 
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I give an interpretation on this result. By introducing nominal rigidities; fluctuations of 
real variables are dampened. (We can see this from decreases in standard deviations of most 
variables in ( I »  Due to the nominal rigidity, the economy cannot exploit all the opportunity 
given by productivity increases compared to the case without nominal rigidities. Now the only 
structural shocks are the productivity shocks. Counter-cyclical policy will further reduce the 
fluctuations of real variables, so we obseJVe the similar direction of the changes. However, 
counter-inflation policy or inflation stabilizing policy will increase the fluctuations of real 
variables toward the initial level. One interesting case is the accommodative inflation stabilizing 
policy for the monopolistic competition models. In these models, the size of two changes are 
almost the same, that is, almost all changes generated from introducing price adjustment costs are 
offset by assuming the accommodative inflation stabilizing policy. 
In summary, I experimented with various monetary policy rules for different models 
under productivity shocks. The major result is that changes in monetary policy rule can generate 
changes in real features of business cycles as much as introducing nominal rigidities. Note that 
the experiments involve hypothetical, but sensible parameter values of monetary policy rules. 
5. Introducing Monetary Disturbances: How reasonable is the AR-J Money Growth Rate 
Rule as ao Approximation to the Realistic Monetary Policy Rule? 
In this section, I examine the changes in the business cycle properties under different 
monetary policy rules when monetary policy disturbances are introduced. In these experiments, 1 
use the AR-l money growth rate rule with stochastic disturbances as the benchmark case. I report 
the business cycle properties under these benchmark cases in Table 5. These models again can 
explain relative volatility of each variable to output, and pro-cyclical behavior and high 
persistency of each variable. 
In Tables 6-1 1 ,  I report the changes in business cycle properties under different monetary 
policy rules. I consider the counter-cyclical policy «3) of each table, 0.= 1 ,  nyy=-. I ), the counter­
inflation policy « 4), Clh=l. �=-.9), the counter-cycliCal-counter-inflation policy « 5), Clh=l, <Xx=­
.5, a,,=-.5) , the SZ rule (6), the CEE rule (7), and the SZ rule (estimated for the period from 
79:4) (8). In addition, for comparison, I report the changes in the business cycle properties when 
nominal rigidities and monetary policy shocks (with the AR-\ rule) are introduced in ( I )  of each 
table. That is, I compare the model of nominal rigidities under the AR-I rule (with monetary 
disturbances) to the models of no nominal rigidities under the fixed money growth rate rule 
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(without monetary disturbances). For example, the NWC-l and the NWC-M models under the 
AR-l rule with monetary disturbances are compared to the RBe model under the fixed money 
growth rate rule without monetary disturbances. I also report, given the nominal rigidity, the 
changes in the business cycle properties when the monetary disturbances are introduced with the 
AR-J rule in (2) of each table. That is, I compare the same model of nominal rigidities under the 
fixed money growth rate rule without monetary disturbances and under the AR-I rule wilh 
monetary disturbances. 
From (2) of each table, we can see that standard deviations of each variable increases in 
most cases when monetary disturbances are introduced with the AR-l rule in the model of 
nominal rigidities. This seems reasonable since another source of disturbances, that is, monetary 
policy shocks, (which is amplified by the AR-l rule with the positive coefficient) can generate 
more volatility of each variable. In addition, correlations and autocorrelations decrease in mO:it 
cases. This is not surprising since the introduction of monetary disturbances in the model with 
nominal rigidities will blur the high correlation and autocorrelation structure generated from the 
productivity shocks. These effects also seem to be amplified by the AR-l rule with the positive 
coefficient. 
When we consider the changes from introducing nominal rigidities in addition to the 
changes from introducing monetary disturbances with the AR-l rule (in (1) of each table), we 
can find some reduction of changes in the standard deviations. As we suggested in the Section 4, 
introduction of nominal rigidities reduces the standard deviations in general. Therefore, the 
direction of the changes in standard deviations is mixed. The changes in the correlation structure 
become more complicate reflecting these two effects. 
Now we examine the changes from the AR-l rule to the other policy rules. In many 
cases, the standard deviation of each variable decreases. In the monopolistic competition models 
with larger nominal rigidities (the MC-S, the MC-IS, and the MC-S-NWC-I models), the 
standard deviations of all variables decrease. In the other models, we also find the decrease in 
many cases. This may suggest the stabilization role of the realistic policy rules, which is not 
incorporated in the AR-J rule. Another interesting pattern is found. The sign of changes in () , 
(6), (7), and (8) are very similar. This also suggests the realistic policy rule seems to be the 
inflation and output stabilization policy. 
Next we examine the size of the changes from the AR-l rule to the other policy rul(' s. 
The changes are substantial in some cases. Sometimes, the standard deviation chang�s 
substantially and the volatility ranking changes. In some cases, the correlation and 
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autocorrelation structure change substantially. The size of these changes are comparable to those 
generated from introducing monetary disturbances with the AR·I rule (in (2) of each table) and 
fi'om introducing monetary disturbances with the AR-l rule and the nominal rigidities (in ( I )  of 
each table). 
In summary, we can generalize the previous findings · changes in monetary policy rule 
can generate changes in the real features of business cycles as much as introducing nominal 
rigidities and monetary disturbances. Compared to the previous section, our experiments also 
consider monetary policy rules estimated from data in addition to some hypothetical policy with 
sensible parameteriZAtion. 
Another interesting implication is that the A R - l  rule may not be a very good 
approximation to the realistic monetary policy rule. This failure of the AR-l rule seem to be 
attribute to the lack of consideration of the monetary authority's systematic stabilization, which 
seems to be better approximation to the real world. Instead, the exogenous monetary policy rule 
slich as the AR-I rule cannot incorporate any stabiliZAtion role on other structural shocks and 
exaggerate the effects introducing monetary disturbances (with positive AR-I coefficient). 
Though it is difficult to conclude the exact magnitude of the failure of the AR-l rule, the size of 
failure could be large in the model with larger nominal rigidities. For example, the experiments 
suggest that in the case of MC-5 model, the differences are .35·.38% of the labor volatility, .42-
.79% of the investment volatility, .08-.21 % of output volatility, 0.01-0.21 of autocorrelation of 
output, and . 1 5-.21 of autocorrelation of labor. 
6. Nominal Features of Business Cycles 
In this section, I examine business cycle properties of nominal variables under different 
monetary policy rules. In Table 1 2  (a), I report standard deviations of inflation, nominal interest 
rate, and the growth rate of money, and the correlation of these variables with output in the U.S. 
Nominal interest rate is more volatile than the growth rate of the money and inflation. The 
growth rate of money is more volatile than inflation rate. Inflation and nominal interest rate are 
pro-cyclical while the growth rate of money is counter-cycJical. 1617 
16 As will be suggested in Section 7, examining correlation between nominal variables may be also 
interesting. I plan to include these experiments in the next version. 
17 One interesting correlation is counter-cyclical behavior of growth rate of money. This correlation is 
difficult to be explained by exogenous money growth rate rule since monetary policy shocks will generate 
positive correlation under nominal rigidities and other structural shocks will generate zero correlation. 
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In Table 12 (b), I report the standard deviations and the correlation with the output for 
the different models under different monetary policy rules. The models and policy rules under 
consideration are the same as in Section 5 (with monetary disturbances). I do not report the 
results for the experiments in Section 4 since these standard deviations and correlations seem 
very unrealistic without monetary disturbances even though the changes are even more dramatic 
in this case. 
We can see that the ability of these models to match the movements of the nominal 
variables is questionable in general.1& The standard deviation of inflation rate is too high 
compared to the data while the standard deviation of money is too low. Correlation of inflation 
and output is negative in the nominal wage contract models and the models with small nominal 
rigidities (RBC, MC-I, MC-O). However, these models still can generate similar magnitude of 
standard deviation of the growth rate of the money and positive correlation of nominal interest 
rate and output. Monopolistic Competition models with larger price adjustment costs can 
generate positive correlation of inflation rate and output. Some models can produce reasonable 
values of standard deviation of inflation rate and negative correlation of money growtt. rate and 
output. And a few models can generate higher standard deviation of nominal interest rate and 
output. Again, I do not further investigate which models can match the data better relatively. 
In many cases, business cycle properties of nominal variables change substantially under 
different monetary policy rules as suggested by Gavin and Kydland [1 996] using the model 
without nominal rigidities under hypothetical policy rules. Here, their results are extended to the 
models with nominal rigidities and the policy rules estimated from data.19 For example, the 
standard deviation of inflation under the counter-cyclical policy is three times bigger than those 
under the counter-inflation policy in the RBC and the MC-O models. (The difference in absolute 
values is 1.5%, and the AR-J rule is in between.) As an another example, in the NWC-M model, 
the correlation of nominal interest rate and output under the counter-cyclical policy is 0.05 while 
it is 0.60 under the counter-inflation policy. 
In addition, the business cycle properties of nominal variables under the AR-l rule are 
often substantially different from those under the more realistic monetary policy rule. In general, 
These negative correlation seem suggest that counter-cyclical role of monetary policy. We do find smaller 
positive correlation, indeed negative in some cases, under more realistic monetary policy rules. 
l' King and Watson [ 1 996] suggested that current monetary business cycle models cannot match all 
dimensions of business cycle properties in the data. 
19 One interesting result related to Gavin and Kydland [ 1 996] is that the changes in nominal features seems 
to become smaller for the model with nominal rigidities. In many cases, the changes are greater in the RBe 
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compared to those under the AR-l rule, the standard deviation of inflation, nominal interest rate, 
and the growth rate of money decrease, correlation of output and inflation becomes smaller.2o As 
an extreme example, in the MC-5-NWC-1 model, 0.25, a positive correlation of inflation and 
output under the AR-I rule changes to very small number or even negative under other monetary 
policy rules, some of which are more realistic than the AR-I rule. As an another example, in the 
NWC-l model, 0.75 of the standard deviation of nominal interest rate under the AR-I rule 
decreases substantially to less than 0.10 under the SZ rule. 
These results also suggest some caution to the monetary business cycle researchers 
trying to match nominal features of business cycles under the simple exogenous specification of 
monetary policy rules such as the AR-J rule. Using the previous example of the MC-5-NWC-I 
model. the researcher using the AR-l rule may argue that the MC-5-NWC-l model can match the 
po sitive correlation of inflation and output. However, if he specifies more realistic monetary 
policy rule, for example. the SZ (79:4-) rule, the correlation is -0.01, which is substantially 
different from the previous positive correlation. Of course, there are some more robust features 
thl t the properties are not much different under the AR-I rule and under the realistic monetary 
policy rule. But it would be better to specify the realistic monetary policy rule, rather than 
relying on the plain luck. 
7. Other Experiments 
In this section, I list two interesting cases where monetary policy rule may affect the 
business cycle properties substantially. The first one is related to the nominal liquidity effect, the 
effects on the nominal variable. The second one is related to effects on the real variables. 
1 )  Liquidity Effects and Inflation Expectation 
Many previous researchers try to find the liquidity effect of monetary policy shocks in 
the theoretical model with the money. (For example, King [ 1992] and King and Watson [1996]) 
mooel and the MC-O model where there are no nominal rigidities, compared to those in the other models 
with nominal rigidities. 
20 Again. the decrease in the standard deviation of inflation and the correlation of output and inflation 
sug est stabilizing role of realistic monetary policy rule which is not incorporate din the AR- I rule. 
However. decrease in nominal interest rate and growth rate of money are somewhat difficult to explain since 
monetary authority may increase volatility of these instruments to stabilize inflation. We may have better 
explanation by incorporating money demand disturbances or financial market disturbances. 
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Here, I suggest that the presence of the liquidity effects may critically depend on the specification 
of monetary policy rule. 
In Figure 1, I report the impulse response to monetary policy shocks under different 
monetary policy rules for the RBC model. I consider the fixed money growth rate rule (fixed Mg), 
the AR-l rule, the pro-inflation policy which increases 1% of the growth rate of money in 
response to the 1% increase in the lagged inflation rate Oaginf=.42), the counter-inflation policy 
which decreases 10/0 of the growth rate of money in rpsponse to the 10/0 increase in the lagged 
inflation rate (laginf=-.42), the SZ rule, and the CEE rule. Each line is the responses to the lr10 
changes in the growth rate of the money in the case of the fixed money growth rate rule, the AR-l 
rule, the pro-inflation policy, and the counter-inflation policy. For the responses under the SZ and 
the CEE rules, I adjust the size of the shocks, using the relative size of estimated standaJd 
deviation of monetary policy shocks?1 
As easily seen in the Figurel the responses of nominal interest rate are different und(�r 
different monetary policy rules. Under the fixed money growth rate rule, the nominal interest rate 
does not respond at all since in this flexible price model, the price level adjust instantaneously, 
the inflation expectation is zero. Under the AR-1 rule, due to the increase in inflation expectation 
(from future increases in the growth rate of money), the nominal interest rate is above its steady 
state. lbat is, we find the opposite case of the liquidity effect. Next, I consider the pro-inflation 
policy on the lagged inflation rate, the responses are very similar to the AR-l. The increase in the 
growth rate of money today increases inflation today, and on the next date monetary authority 
increases money growth rate again following the feedback rule, then in the next period, there is 
inflation . . . .. So, the responses of money growth rate and inflation are similar to the AR-l rule 
case, and rational economic agents expect these future events, and the nominal interest rate 
increases. 
Then, it is not 50 difficult to generate the nominal liquidity effect. All we need is to 
specify a monetary policy rule generating decrease in the future growth rate of money and 
deflation expectation under a positive money growth rate shock. The counter-inflation policy with 
lagged inflation rate is one case. The increase in the growth rate of money today increases 
inflation today, and the next date monetary authority decreases money growth rate follOwing the 
feedback. rule, then in the next period, there is deflation. nus deflation expectation decreases the 
nominal interest rate today, and under this feedback rule, we do find the liquidity effect. 
11 In fact, this adjusbnent does not play much role since the magnitude of the standard deviation is not much 
different under the AR·l rule and the SZ or the CEE rules. 
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Then, what are the responses under the rules estimated from data? In the graphs for the 
5Z and the CEE rules. we do not find the liquidity effect. But note the response of inflation. It 
sharply drops in the next period (compared to the AR-l rule), the magnitude of increase in the 
nominal interest rate is far smaller than the AR-l rule case. This sU$&ests that the AR-I 
specification may exaggerate the positive response of interest rate and the absence of the 
liquidity effect. I further pursue this possibility in the model with nominal rigidities and 1 report 
�>ne example in which the liquidity effect is found under the SZ and the CEE rules but not under 
the AR-I rule. I report the graph in the Figure 2.22 
I also did some experiments with these Jagged inflation rate rule. In some cases, the 
changes in nominal features of business cycles, for example the correlation of nominal interest 
rate and inflation, could be very much different under this kind of rule. 
This experiment shows that private agent's expectation on monetary authority'S 
stabilization can feed into the effects of monetary policy shocks, in particular, the liquidity 
effect. 
2) Feedback rules on the Level of Output and the Productivity Shocks 
Now I consider another feedback rule that the monetary authority changes the growth 
rate of money in response to the changes in the level of output. Under this feedback rule, the 
transmission of productivity shocks substantially change even when the effects of monetary 
policy shocks are small. 
In Figure 3, I report the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the MC-! model. 
In response to I % increase in the growth rate of money, investment increases about .6 %, output 
increases .2 %, and labor increases .3 %, and consumption increases less than .0 I 5%. The 
increases in output, investment and labor go back to the level close to the initial level very soon. 
That is, the real effects of monetary policy shocks are relatively small and short-lived. In the 
conventional tenn, the nominal rigidity in this model is small. 
In Figure 4, I report the impulse responses to productivity shocks. '+' lines are the 
responses in the MC-! model (with nominal rigidities) under the fixed money growth rate rule 
and dotted lines are the responses in the MC-O model (without nominal rigidities) under the fixed 
money growth rate rule. We can see that there are only small differences, especially for the 
impact effect on the investment, labor, and output. Again, we may suggest that the nominal 
rigidity in the model is small. 
22 To generate the nominal liquidity effect, 1 introduce the large adjustment costs to the investment. 
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In Figure 4, I also report the impulse responses to productivity shocks in the MC-I model 
under the feedback rule on the level of output (the solid line). The parameter values are (lh = 1 
and <ly = -1 ,  that is, the monetary authority increases the growth rate of money by I % in response 
to 1 % decrease in the level of output from its steady sate. The differences are quite substantiul 
compared to either the magnitude of the effects of monetary policy shocks or the magnitude of 
the effects of introducing nominal rigidities. The differences to the same model under the fixed 
money growth rate rule are 2% for the investment, .4% for the output, and .7% for the labor. And 
the differences last for the very long period. The consumption movements is more striking. The 
difference in the consumption movements is .3 % at the peak, which is more than 20 times 
greater than the effects of monetary policy shocks on consumption. 
In fact, this dramatic changes in. the transmission of productivity shock is not very 
surprising if we see the impulse responses of the growth rate of money under the feedback rule. 
When there is a productivity shock, output level is above its steady state for a long time, which 
generates prolonged decreases in the growth rate of money. These prolonged decreases in the 
growth rate of money generate the huge difference in the transmission of the productivity shock5. . 
Though these huge differences are not very surprising once we see the impulse responses 
of the growth rate of the money, this experiment suggests that real properties of business cycles 
may change substantially under some monetary policy rules even in the case where nominal 
rigidities are small (in conventional tenn) so that monetary policy shocks have small effects on 
real variables. 
8. Conclusion 
By constructing a variety of DSGE models, I examine the business cycle properties 
under different monetary policy rules. Different monetary policy rules generate substantially 
different nominal features of business cycles. Further, different monetary policy rules can 
generate somewhat different real features of business cycles. It is difficult to conclude what is the 
exact size of changes in business cycle properties under different monetary policy rules since the 
exact size depends on the nature and the size of rigidities in the economy, which we do not have 
clear idea. However, the changes in the real properties of business cycles under different 
monetary policy rules are as large as (or even larger than) the changes generated from 
introducing rigidities themselves (and monetary policy shocks). 
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These changes in the business cycle properties are examined under sensible values of 
parameters in the monetary policy rules including the monetary policy rules estimated from data 
using the identified V AR models. The exogenous specification of monetary policy rules, the AR·l 
rule in particular, does not incorporate monetary authority's systematic reactions to the state of 
economy as a stabilization. As a result, the AR·l money growth rate rule exaggerates the effects 
fl.·om introducing nominal rigidities and monetary policy disturbances and the transmission of 
productivity shocks. Therefore, the business cycle properties under the realistic monetary policy 
rules and those under the AR·l rule are quite different, and the AR-l rule, which has been 
frequently postulated by past researchers, does not seem to be a good approximation to the 
realistic monetary policy rules.23 
Other interesting findings are: first, the specification of monetary policy rules may 
critically affect the presence of the nominal liquidity effect in some cases. A counter-inflation 
monetary policy may lead to reductions on expected inflation which may help generating the 
nominal liquidity effect. The inflation stabilizing policy may form the deflationary expectation 
under the expansionary monetary policy shocks, which may help generating the nominal liquidity 
effect. Second, even i.'1 the case of small nominal rigidity in the conventional term (when the 
effects of monetary policy shocks are small), real prope,rties of business cycles under some 
monetary policy rules may be substantially different. Some monetary policy rules may generate 
large and persistent deviations in growth rate of money, so the resulting transmission mechanism 
of structural shocks may be substantially different. 
All these results suggest that, by adopting different monetary policy rules, monetary 
authority seems to have the potential to affect the real economy substantially4 and that 
incorporating realistic monetary policy rules allowing endogenous reaction to the state of the 
economy is important for monetary business cycle research. 
II This result seems to be inconsistent with Yun (1996]. which suggested monopolistic competition models 
('an better explain positive output·inflation correlation regardless of endogenous or exogenous money supply 
rules, First, he concentrated on one feature of business cycle properties. As suggested in Section 6, there may 
be some robust features that do not depend much on the monetary policy rule. However, some features do 
depend on the monetary policy rule, Second, his endogenous money supply may not capture much of 
(ndogenous reaction of the monetary authority due to simple specification or due to money demand relation 
that he do not separate. In the impulse responses graphs, technology shocks are more destabilizing under 
E'ndogenous monetary policy rule compared to under exogenous policy rule. 
11 These results are not necessarily inconsistent with findings of Sims and Zha (19951 and Kim (1995]. 
Monetary policy rules considered here are similar to "dramatic" changes in monetary policy rule considered 
by those studies. Those studies suggested that monetary authority has the potential to affect real economy 
�ubstantially by changing monetary policy rule dramatically, 
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Table I. Cyclical Behavior of the U.S. Economy: Deviations from Trend of Key Variables: 60:1-96 4 
Variable SD Cross-Correlation of Out ut to· 
% -3 -2 -I • 1 2 3 
Investment 7.62 .4, .62 .77 .88 .7S .54 .l. 
GNP 1.48 .48 .7 • . 88 I. • . 88 .7 • .48 
Hours 1.30 .ll .55 .76 .9() ." . 76 .6 • 
Wae;e* 0.76 .47 .58 .66 .68 .59 .46 .2' 
Cons ND · 0.86 .55 .68 .78 .77 .64 .47 .27 
• reproduced from Cooley and Prescott [1995] (54:1-91 :2) 
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Table 2. Benchmark Models: Constant Money Growth Rate Rule ( a, .  1 ) 
(1) Real Business Cycle Model 
Vu. SO R�k Corr. With " 
% SO -I 0 1 
Inv. 3.80 1 0.67 0.99 0.74 
Y 1.39 2 0.12 1.00 0.12 
L 0.83 ) 0.64 0.98 0.74 
W 0.61 • 0.78 0.96 0.64 
C 0.43 , 0.78 0.87 0.54 
(3) Multi -Period Nomina' Wage Contract 
Vu. SO R�k Corr. With ". 
" SO -I 0 1 
inv. 3.08 1 0.75 0.99 0.80 
1 .16 2 0.78 1.00 0.78 
1 0.60 l 0.78 0.80 060 
w 0.'0 4 0.84 0.94 0.67 
, 0.39 , 0 7') 0.91 0.64 
(5) Monopolistic Competition with 
Price Adjustment Cosu ( +. - 1 ) 
vu. SO �k Carr. With ". 
% SO -I 0 1 
inv. 3.56 1 0.77 0.99 0.81 
1.42 2 0.7') 1.00 0.79 
1 0.52 , 0.89 0.92 0.74 
w 0.67 ) 0.83 0.97 0.12 
, 0.'6 • 0.7') 0.94 0.68 
(7) Monopolistic Competition with 
Price Adjustment Costs ( ,. · 1 5 )  
Vu. SO RMk Corr. With ,+. 
% SO -I 0 1 
inv. 1.80 1 0.98 0.91 0.77 
0.67 l 0.95 1.00 0.95 
1 1.22 2 0.41 0.09 -0.15 
w 0.30 , 0.91 0.96 0.89 
, 0.41 4 0.36 0.62 0.75 
Auto 
1 
0.71 
012 
0.71 
0.77 
0 82 
A.", 
1 
0.78 
0.78 
0.82 
0.85 
0.82 
Auto 
1 
080 
0.79 
0.86 
0.82 
0.7') 
Auto 
, 
0.91 
0.95 
0.62 
0.92 
0.64 
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(2) One -Period Nominal Wage Contract 
VU SO ...,k Corr. With ,+. 
% SO - I  0 1 
inv. 3.45 1 0.81 0.99 0.84 
1.27 2 0.83 1.00 0.83 
1 0.77 l 0.92 0.87 0.63 
. 0.72 • 0.49 0.84 0.80 
, 0.41 , 0.7') 0.89 0.68 
(4) Monopolistic Competition witbout 
Price Adjustment Cosu ( 'p - 0 )  
Vu. SO � Corr. With ,+
. 
% SO - I  0 1 
inv. l.'" 1 0.67 0.99 0.74 
I.SO 2 0.72 1.00 0.72 
1 0.59 4 0.60 0.96 0.74 
w 0.70 l 0.77 0.97 0.65 
, 0.58 , 0.78 0.93 0.60 
(6) Monopolistic Competition wilh 
Price Adjustment Cosu ( ••• 5 ) 
Vu. SO R�k Corr. With 1+· 
% SO - I  0 1 
Inv. 2.78 1 0.94 0.99 0.88 
1 .12 2 0.90 1.00 0.90 
1 0.'" ) 0.12 0.37 0.12 
w 0.52 • 0.92 0.96 0.83 
, 0.48 , 0.71 0.91 0.85 
(8) Monopolistic Competition ( +. - 5 ) with 
One -Period Nominal Wage Contract 
Vu. SO ...,k Carr. With ,+. 
% SO - I  0 1 
inv. 2.76 1 0.95 0.98 0.87 
1.09 2 0.92 1.00 0.92 
1 0.94 l 0.68 0.37 0.08 
w 0.52 4 0.79 0.91 0.87 
, 0.46 , 0.68 0.87 0.88 
Auto 
1 
0.84 
0.83 
0.68 
0045 
0.83 
Auto 
1 
0.71 
0.72 
0.71 
0.76 
0.79 
Auto 
1 
0.92 
0.90 
0.52 
0.91 
0.75 
Auto 
1 
0.9' 
0.92 
0.48 
0.77 
0.74 
Table 3. Changes in Population Moments -Nominal Wage Contract Models 
(Compared to the same model with Constant Money Growth Rate Policy except (or (1) 
(I) Constant Money Growth Rate Rule (a� = 1 ). 
compared to the RBC model with Constant M growth rate rule 
A. One -Period Nominal Wage Contract B. Multi -Period Nominal Wage Contract 
vu. SO R�k Diff COrT. With ... Auto 
% SO SO -I 0 1 1 
Inv. 3.45 1 -0.35 0.14 0.00 0.11  0.13 
Y 1 .27 2 -0. 12 0.12 0.00 0. 12 0.12 
L 0.77 3 -0.05 0 .28 -0. 1 1  -0. 1 1  -0.02 
W 0.72 4 0. 1 1  -0.29 -0. 12 0. 17 -0.32 
C 0.4 1 , -0.02 0.0 1 0.01 0.14 om 
vu. SO R�k Diff COrT. With 1+ AUlo 
% SO SO - \  0 1 1 
inv. 3.08 1 -0.73 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.Q7 
1 . 16 2 -0.23 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1 0.60 3 -0.23 0.14 -O. IS -0.14 0. 1 1  
w 0.50 4 -0.10 0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.08 , 0.39 S -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.00 l
(2) Counter-Cyclical Policy ( a.,  = 1, a". = -1) 
A. One -Period Nominal Wage Contract B. Multi -Period Nominal Wage Contract 
vu. SO �k Diff COrT. With 1+ A",o vu_ SO �k Diff Corr. Wilh 1+ AulO 
% SO SO -I 0 \ 1 % SO SO -\ 0 1 1 
Inv. 3.44 \ -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 Inv. 2.S5 \ -0.22 0. 1 1  0.00 0.08 0.10 
Y 1.25 2 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.0 1  1 .07 2 -0.09 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.09 
L 1 .03 3 0.26 -0.14 -0.13 -0.29 -0,38 \ 0.81 3 0.21 0.02 -0.23 -0.21 -0.08 
W 0.84 4 0. 13 -0.20 -0.27 0.03 -0.19 w 0.48 4 -0.03 0_09 0.02 0.05 0.Q7 
C 0.39 , -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.01 , 0.36 S -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.00 
(3) Pro-Cyclical Policy ( a.h" I. a.,.-,.- .. I) 
A. One -Period Nominal Wage Contract B. Mulli -i'edod Nominal Wage Contract 
vu. SO R�k Diff Corr. With . t+' Auto vu. SO R�k Diff Corr. With 1+· Auto 
% SO SO -\ 0 1 \ % SO SO - \  0 1 \ 
Inv. 4.94 \ 1.49 -0.42 0.00 -0.36 -0.42 inv. 4.47 \ 1 .40 -0.26 0.00 -0.23 -0.26 
Y 172 2 0.45 -0.36 0.00 -0.36 ·0.36 1 .59 2 0.43 -0.22 0.00 -0.22 -0.22 
L 1.58 3 0.81 -0.79 0.05 ·0.20 -0.50 I 1.27 1 0.67 -0.52 0.13 -0.07 -0.51 
w 0.67 4 -0.04 0.4 1 _0.44 -0.60 0.30 w 0.70 4 0. 19 -0.24 0 04 -0.17 -0.2� 
C 0.48 , 0.07 ·0.09 -0.09 -0.36 -0.02 , 0.46 , 0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.24 ·0.01 
(4) Counter-Inflation Policy ( a� = I, a.,. = -0.9) 
A. One -Period Nominal Wage Contract B. Multi -Period Nominal Wage Contract 
vu. SO R�k Diff Corr. With 1+· Auto vu. SO R�k Diff COrT. With 1+ Auto 
% SO SO - I  0 \ \ % SO SO - \  0 1 1 
lnv. 3.68 \ 0.23 -0.09 0.00 -0.07 ·0.08 inv. 1.43 1 0.35 -0.10 0.00 -0.09 -O.lf 
1.35 2 0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 1.27 2 0. 1 1 -O.OS 0.00 -0.08 -o.m 
\ 0.76 3 -0.01 -0. 16 0. 1 1 0. 14  0. 1 2 1 0.66 3 0.06 -0.22 0.15 0.06 -0.2/ 
w 0.63 4 -0.09 0.22 0.13 -0. 1 1  0.24 w 0.55 4 0.05 ·0.09 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 
, 0.43 S 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0. 10 -0.01 , 0.41 S 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 O.()(I 
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Table 4. Changes in Population Moments - Monopolistic Compo Model with Price Adjustment Costs 
( Compared to tbe same model with Constant Money Growth Rate Polky except for (I» 
(I) Constant Money Growtb Rate Rule ( a. - 1  ), 
compared to tbe MC model witb ., = 0 and Constant Money Growth Rate Polky Rule 
A.Ij!," I 8. f," 5 
Vu. SO .... Oi« Corr. With ". Aulo vu. SO ... , Oiff Corr. With 
% SO SO - I  0 1 1 % SO SO -I  0 
in\l. 3.>6 1 -0.24 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.119 in\l. >7' 1 -1.01 0.26 -0.01 
1.42 2 -0.08 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.07 1 . 1 2  2 -0.38 0.19 0.00 
1 0.52 S' -0.08 0.28 -0.04 0.00 0.1 5  1 0.79 3' 0.19 0.12 -0.59 
w 0.67 3 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.06 0 06 w 0.52 4' -0.18 O.IS -0.01 
, 0.56 4' -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.00 , 0.48 " -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 
(l) Counter-Cyclical Policy ( a. - 1, Cln ·  -I) 
A·f, · l  8.,,-5 
Vu. SO .... Oi« Corr. Wilh " . Aula vu. SO R�' Oiff Corr. With 
% SO SO -I 0 1 1 % SO SO -I 0 
in\l. 3.33 1 -0.22 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.06 in\l. 2.16 1 ·0.62 O.OS -0.03 
1.34 2 -0.08 O.OS 0.00 O.OS 0.05 0.85 3' -0.28 0.03 0.00 
1 0.54 4' 0.02 0.07 -0.17 -0.18 -0.14 1 1 .07 2' 0.28 -0.22 -0.02 
w 0.63 3 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 w 0.39 " .0.14 0.01 0.00 
, 0.54 4 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 , 0.43 4' -0.05 -0.18 -0.13 
(3) P�Cyciital Policy (n., - 1, Cln - 1) 
Vu. SO .... Di« COlT. With ". AUlD Vu. SO ""'. Oiff Corr. With 
% SO SO - I  0 1 1 % SO SO - I  0 
in\l. 3.79 1 0.24 -0.10 0.00 -0.07 -0.119 in\l. 3.79 1 1.01 -0.26 0.01 
I.SO 2 0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 I.SO 2 0.33 -0.19 0.00 
1 0.59 4' 0.08 .0.29 0 04 0.00 .0.16 1 0.60 4' -0.19 -0.12 0.S9 
w 0.70 3 0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 w 0.70 3' 0.\8 -0. 15 0.01 
, 0.58 " 0.02 -0.01 -0,01 -0.08 0.00 , 0.S8 , 0.10 0.07 0.02 
(4) Counter-lnDation Policy ( a.,  - I, a" '"' -0.9) 
A·t, - l  8.',-5 
Vu. SO R�' Diff Carr. With ". AUlD Vu. SO R�' Oiff Corr. With 
% SO SO - I  0 1 1 % SO SO -I 0 
in\l. 3.67 1 0.11  -0.04 0.00 .0.03 -0.04 inv. 3.20 1 0.41 -0.07 0.01 
1.46 2 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 .0.03 1 .29 2 0.17 -0.04 0.00 
1 0.54 , 0.02 -0. 1 1  0.04 0.03 -0.03 1 0.58 4' -0.20 0.20 0.28 
w 0.68 3 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 .0.03 w 0.6\ 3' 0.08 -0.03 0.00 
, 0.57 4 0.01 0.00 0.00' -0.04 0.00 , 0.52 6 0.05 0.06 0.03 
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". A". 
1 1 
0.14 0.21 
0.19 0.19 
-0.62 -0.19 
0.17 0.15 
0.25 -0.04 
" Aulo 
1 1 
·0.04 0.01 
0.03 0.03 
-0.02 0.06 
0.04 0.02 
-0.01 -0.07 
". Auto 
1 1 
-0.14 -0.21 
-0.19 -0.19 
0.62 0.18 
-0. 1 7  -0.15 
-0,25 0 04 
" AUIO 
1 1 
-0.02 -0.04 
-0.04 -0.04 
0.31 0 . 1 1  
-0.04 -0.04 
-0.07 0.03 
Table 4 (Continue). Changes in Population Moments 
(I) Constant Money Growth Rate Rule (ak" 1 ) 
compared to the MC model with 'p = 0 and Constant Money Growth Rate Rule 
D. t period-NWCI - MC with " e5 
Vv. SO RM' Oiff Corr. With ,+. Auto Vv. SO RM' Oi« COlT. With ,+ Auto 
% SO SO . [  0 [ [ % SO SO .[ 0 [ [ 
inv. 1.80 [ -2.00 0.31 -0.09 0.03 0.20 inv. 2.76 [ ·1.03 0.28 -0.01 0.13 0 2  
0.67 3 -0.83 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.23 1.09 2 -0.41 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.2 
[ 1.22 2 0.62 ·0.20 -0.87 -0.89 -0.08 [ 0.94 3' 0,34 0.07 -0.59 -0.67 ·0.2 
w 0.30 , -0 40 0.14 ·0.02 0.24 0.16 w 0.52 4' -0.19 0.02 ·0.06 0.22 0.01 
, 0.41 4 -0.1 7 -0.43 -0.3\ 0.15 -0.15 , 0.46 , -0. 1 1  -0. 1 1  -0.07 0.28 ·0.0 
(2) Counter-Cyclical Policy (<It. - t, Cln "  -I) 
D. I period-NWCI - MC with ,,=S 
Vv. SO RM' Diff Corr. With ,+. Auto Vv. SO RMk Oiff COlT. With ,+. Auto 
% SO SO .[ 0 [ [ % SO SO .[ 0 [ [ 
inv. 1.36 2' -0.44 -0.11 -0.20 -0.25 ·0.08 inv. 2.22 [ ·0.55 0.03 -O.Q3 -0.05 -0.02 
0.39 4' -0.28 0.01 0.00 om 0.01 0.82 3 -0.27 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 
[ 1.39 [' 0.18 -0.10 -0.08 ·0.07 0.05 [ 1.22 2 0.28 ·0, I S  -0.12 -0.12 0.09 
w 0.17 , -0.13 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 -0.08 w 0.40 , -0.12 -0. 13 -0.15 -0.07 -0.22 
C 0.43 3' 0.02 -OJO -0.28 ·0.22 -0.01 , 0.41 4 ·0.05 -0.23 -0.19 -0.06 -0.08 
(3) Pro-Cyclical Policy (ak = I, Cln = I) 
D. t period-NWCI - MC with 'p""5 
Var. SO RM' Oiff COlT. With ,+ AUIO Vv. SO RMk Oiff Corr. With ,+ Aut,) 
% SO SO . [  0 [ [ % SO SO .[ 0 [ [ 
Inv. 3.80 [ 2.00 -0.32 0.09 -0.04 ·0.20 inv. 5.51 [ 2.75 -0.64 0.01 -0.46 -0.' 
Y !.SO 2' 0.83 -023 0.00 -0.23 ·0.23 2.00 2 0.91 ·0.51 -O.SI 0.00 -051 
L 0.60 4' -0.62 0.18 0.87 0.89 0.07 [ !.S8 3 0.64 -0.68 0.52 0.27 -0.4 
W 0.70 3' 0.40 -0.14 0.02 -0.24 -0.17 w 0.78 4 0.27 0.09 -0.56 -0.70 -0.0 
C 0.58 " 0.17 0.42 OJI -0.15 0.15 , 0.64 , 0.]8 0.02 -0.04 .{l.57 O . 
(4) Counter-Inflation Policy ( ak = I, a.. = -0.9) 
D. I period-NWCI - MC with ,,<::5 
Var. SO RM' Oiff Corr. With ,+. AUIO Var. SO RMk Di« Corr. With ,+. AUlo 
% SO SO .[ 0 [ [ % SO SO .[ 0 [ [ 
inv. 2.37 [ 0.57 ·0.01 0.07 0.09 0.03 inv. 3 . 17 [ 0.4] ·0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.0 
Y 0.95 3 0.28 ·0.02 0.00 ·0.02 ·0.02 1.28 2 0.19 ·O.OS 0.00 ·0.05 -O.rs 
L 0.96 2 ·0.26 0.15 0.12 0.12 _0,07 [ 0.61 3 ·0.33 0.22 0.24 0.31 0.10 
W 0.44 4' 0.14 0.02 0.01 ·0.04 0.00 w 0.60 4 0.09 0,07 0.06 -0.07 0.( 8 
C 0.44 4 0.03 0.26 0.22 0. 1 1  0.07 , 0.52 , 0 06 0 09 0.07 -0.08 0.(.4 
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Table S. Benchmark Case: AR·I Money Growth Rate Rule with Monetary Disturbances ( a.. - I • 
a.r "" I • 0', - .0075 • 0', - .0070 ) 
(I) Real Business Cycle Model 
v�. SO """ ColT. With ,+' 
% SO .] 0 ] 
iny. 3.80 ] 0.67 0 99  0.74 
1.39 2 0.72 100 0.72 
] 0.83 , 0.64 0.98 0.74 
w 0.6\ , 0.78 0.96 0.64 
, 0.43 , 0.78 0.87 0.54 
(3) Multi -Period Nominal Wage Contract 
Vu. SO ... , COlT. With ,+' 
% SO .]  0 ] 
iny. 3.32 ] 0.70 0.99 0.74 
122 2 0.74 100 0.74 
] 0.90 , 0.57 0.74 0.47 
w 0." , 0.79 0.94 0.63 
, 0.39 , O.n 0.87 0.60 
(5) Monopolistic Competition with 
Price Adjustment Costs (., " 1 ) 
Vu. SO ..... COlT. With ,+' 
% SO . ]  0 ] 
iny. 3.62 ] 0.76 0.99 0.80 
1.44 2 0.78 100 0.78 
] 0.60 , 0.79 0.86 0.67 
w 0.67 , 0.83 0.97 0.71 
, 0." , 0.78 0.93 0.68 
(7) Monopolistic Competition with 
Price Adjustment Costs ('p - I S )  
Vu. SO .... , COlT. With ,+' 
.. SO .] 0 ] 
jny. 4.36 ] 0.8<) 0.97 0.83 
U , 0.85 100 0.85 
] 2.10 2 0.66 0.73 0.56 
w 0.58 , 0.90 0.93 072 
, 0.49 , 0.35 0.32 0.25 
A"� 
] 
0.71 
0.72 
0.71 
O.n 
0.82 
Auto 
] 
0.72 
0.74 
0." 
0.79 
0.82 
Auto 
] 
0 79 
0.78 
0.75 
0.81 
0.79 
Auto 
] 
0.83 
0.85 
0.75 
0." 
0.72 
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(2) One -Period Nominal Wage Contract 
Vu. SO R�' COlT. With ,+' 
% SO .] 0 ] 
iny. 3.76 ] 0.69 0.99 0.72 
1.35 2 0.73 100 0.73 
] 1 . 1 1  , 0.58 0.81 0.40 
w 0.79 , 0.43 0.57 0.69 
, 0.41 , 0.75 0.84 0.63 
(4) Monopolistic Competition without 
Price Adjustment Costs ( ., -0 ) 
Vu. SO R�' ColT. With ,+' 
•• SO .] 0 ] 
iny. '.79 ] 0.67 0.99 0.74 
ISO 2 0.72 100 0.72 
] 0.59 , 0.60 0.96 0.74 
w 0.70 , O.n 0.97 0.65 
, 0.58 S 0.78 0.93 0.60 
(6) Monopolistic Competition with 
Price Adjustment Costs ( ., - 5 ) 
Vu. SO """ COlT. With ,.' 
% SO .] 0 ] 
iny. '.72 ] 0.82 0.98 0.82 
1.35 2 0.84 100 0.84 
] 1.34 , 0.64 0.62 0.39 
w 0.61 , 0.88 0.96 0.76 
, O.SO , 0.65 0.76 0.67 
(8) Monopolistic Competition ( +p - S ) with 
One -Period Nominal Wage Contract 
Vu. SO """ COlT. With ,.' 
% SO . ]  0 ] 
iny. 4.20 ] 0.77 0.98 o.n 
1 .45 , 0.80 100 0.80 
] 168 2 0.62 0.70 0.41 
w 0.64 , 0.85 0.75 0.59 
, 0.49 , 0.59 0.66 0.60 
AUIO 
] 
0.69 
0.73 
0.29 
0.35 
0.83 
AUlo 
] 
0.71 
0.72 
0.71 
0.76 
0.79 
A� 
] 
0.82 
0.84 
0.64 
0.87 
0.76 
Auto 
] 
0.76 
08<) 
0.60 
0.70 
0.76 
Table 6. Changes in Population Moments-One-.Period Nominal Wage Contnd Model, �ompared to 
tbe AR·I Rule with Monetary Disturbances 
(I) AR-I Rule ( a. "  1 • a.1 " 0.42, 0_" .0075 ) 
compared to tbe RBC model under Constant Money 
Growth Rate Rule witbout Monetary DisturbaD�es 
Vu. SO '�k Oiff Corr. With ... . ,," 
" SO SO .\ 0 \ \ 
inv. 3.76 \ -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
'1.3.5 2 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.0\ 0.0\ 
\ 1 . 1 1  3 0.29 -0.116 -0.\7 ·0.34 -0.4\ 
w 0.79 , 0.\9 -0.34 -0.39 0.05 -0.42 
, 0.4\ , -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.01 
(3) a. "  1. a,.,. "  -1. a. c 0.0075 
V�. SO '�k Oiff Con. With ... Auto 
" SO SO .\  0 \ \ 
inv. 3." \ -0.20 0.08 0.00 O.OS 0.06 
1.2! 2 -0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.Q7 
\ \.14 1 O.oJ 0.10 -0.116 -0. 1 1  -0.06 
w 0.87 , 0.08 -0. IS -0.08 0.10 -0. 1 \  
, 0.39 , -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.01 
(5) a. - I. a,.,. " -0.5. a.." -0.5, a. :> 0.75 
Vu. SO �k Oi" Corr. With ... ."" 
" SO SO .\  0 \ \ 
inv. 3.58 \ .(l.18 0.07 0.00 0." 0.08 
1.31 2 -0.05 0.116 0.00 0.116 0.116 
\ 0.92 3 .(l.19 0.\6 0.02 0.11 0.17 
w 0.15 • -O.OS 0.03 0.16 0.116 0.06 
, 0.41 , 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 
(7)C[[ Rule 
V�. SO '�k Olff Corr. With ... Auto 
% SO SO .\  0 \ \ 
inv. 3.1S \ ·0.0\ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
1.)6 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
\ 1.02 3 -0.09 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.09 
w 0.14 • ·0.05 0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.08 
, 0.42 , 0.01 0.0\ 0.0\ -0.02 0.00 
(2) AR-I Rule( a.-I.a.1 - 0.42, o. =.0075) 
�omp ... ed to the same model under 
Constant M Growtb, witbout M dist. 
V�. SO '�k Diff Corr. With 
% SO SO .\  0 
inv. 3.76 \ 0.31 .(l.12 0.00 
1.3S 2 0.08 -0.10 0.00 
\ 1 . 1 1  3 0.34 -0.39 -0.06 
w 0.79 , 0.08 .(l.02 -0.27 
, 0.41 , 0.00 0.116 -0.04 
(4) a. " 1. a.. " -0.9. a." 0.0075 
Vu. SO �k Diff Corr. With 
" SO SO .\ 0 
Inv. 3.81 \ O.OS -0.02 0.00 
1.39 2 0.03 -0.02 0.00 
\ 0.93 3 -0.18 0.01 0.10 
w 0.67 , -0.13 022 0.24 
, 043 , 0.02 0.02 0.02 
(6) SZ Rule 
V�. SO �k Diff Corr. With 
% SO SO .\ 0 
inv. 3." \ -0.08 0.03 0.00 
1.)3 2 -0.02 0.03 0.00 
\ 1.03 3 -0.08 0.06 0.00 
w o.n • -0.02 0.01 0.116 
, 0.41 , 0110 0.01 0.01 
(8) SZ Rule (79:4-) 
Vu. SO '�k Oiff Corr. With 
% SO SO .\  0 
inv. 1.71 \ -O.OS 0.02 0.00 
1 .35 2 0.00 0.01 0.00 
\ 0.92 1 .(l.20 0.08 0.07 
w 0.70 , -0.10 0.15 0.21 
, 0.42 , 0.01 0.02 0.02 
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, . A". 
\ \ 
-0.12 -0.\ 
-0.10 -0.\ 
-0.23 -OJ 
.(l.\2 -0.\ 
-0.05 0.0 
, •. A"� 
\ \ 
0.00 0.00 
-0.02 -0.02 
0.21 0.22 
-0.05 0.2S 
-0.07 -0.01 
, • . Auto 
\ \ 
0.03 O.O� 
0.03 om 
0.04 o.or; 
0.03 0.02 
0.01 O.O() 
,. Auto 
\ \ 
0.03 0.01 
0.01 0.01 
0.18 0.22 
0.00 0.17 
-0.03 0.00 
Table 7. Chuga in Population Moments-Multi-Period Nominal Wage Contratt Model, tOmpared to 
the AR-I Rule with Monetary Disturbances 
(I) AR·l Rule ( a. "  1 , a.. '= 0.42, a. - .lKnS ) 
tompared to the RBC model under Constant Money 
Growth Rate Rule without Monetary Disturbantes 
VM. SO """ Dif!" Corr. With ... Auto 
% SO SO -, 0 , , 
lnY. 3.32 , -0.49 0.02 0.00 0.01 om 
1.22 2 -0.17 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 
, 0.90 3 0.07 -0.07 -0.24 -0.27 -O. IS 
w 0." , -0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 
, 0.39 , -0.0' -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 
(3) a. - I, a,.,. "  At, a. - 0.0075 
Vu. SO ..", Diff Corr. With '+. A". 
" SO SO -, 0 , , 
inY. ,'" , -0.35 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.12 
1.10 2 -0.12 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 
, 0.92 1 0.02 O.IS -0.14 -0.09 0.09 
w 0.49 4 -0.04 0 . 1 1  -0.02 0.06 0.10 
, 0 36 , -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 
(5) a. '"' 1, a,.,. " -0.5, a,. = -O.s, 0", " 0.75 
M. SO ... , Djff Corr. With ... Auto 
% SO SO -, 0 , , 
iDY. 1.18 , -0. 14 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 
1 .18 2 -0.04 0.Q2 0.00 0.02 0.02 
, 0.73 3 -0.16 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.10 
w 0.S2 4 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 
, 0.39 , 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 
(7) CEE Rule 
vu. SO """ Diff CoTT. With ... Auto 
% SO SO -, 0 , , 
inv. 3.37 , O.OS -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
1.24 2 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
, 0.83 3 -0.06 -0.01 O.OS 0.0> 0.00 
w 0." • 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -O.oJ -0.01 
, 0.40 , 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
(2) AR-I Rule( a.-I, Ut..-G,42, 0"," .0075) 
tompared to the same model under 
Constant M Growth, without M dis!. 
VM. SO RM' Diff Corr. With 
% SO SO -, 0 
ioY. 3.32 , 0.24 -O.OS 0.00 
1.22 2 0.06 -0.04 0.00 
, 0.90 3 0.30 -0.21 -0.06 
w 0." , 0.04 -O.OS 0.01 
, 0.39 , 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
(4) a," I, a. "  -0.9, a." 0.007S 
Vu. SO """ Diff Corr. With 
" SO SO -, 0 
inY. 3.S2 , 0.20 -0.07 0.00 
1.29 2 0.08 -0.05 0.00 
, 0.79 3 -0. 1 1  -0.07 0.14 
w 0.56 4 0.02 -0.06 0.01 
, 0.41 , 0.02 0.00 0.01 
(6) SZ Rule 
Vu. SO """ Ojff Con. With 
" SO SO -, 0 
jny. 3.2S , .(l.07 0.01 0.00 
1.20 2 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
, 0.83 3 -0.07 0.04 0.00 
w 0.S3 4 .(l.01 0.01 0.00 
, 0.39 , 0.00 0.01 0.01 
(8) SZ Rule (79:4-) 
Vu. SO ..", Diff COfT. With 
% SO SO -, 0 
iny. 3.32 , 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.22 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
, 0.90 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
w 0." 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
, 0.39 , 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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... AUla 
, , 
-O.OS -0.06 
-0.04 -0.04 
-0.13 -0.26 
-0.04 -006 
-0.04 0.00 
... AoW 
, , 
-0.05 -0.06 
-o.OS -0.05 
0.12 -0.06 
.(l.01 -O.OS 
-0.06 0.00 
'+. Auto 
, , 
0.01 0.02 
0.01 0.01 
0.02 0.04 
0.0\ 0.02 
0.01 0.00 
... Auto 
, , 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
Tlble 8. Changes In Populltion Moments.Monopolistle Competition Model, with Prke Adjustment 
Cost (4'9 = I ), eomplrcd to the AR·I Rule with Monetary Disturblnces 
(1) AR·I Rule ( a., .. I ,a..." 0.42, 0', '" .0075 ) 
complred to tbe RBe model under Constlnt Money 
Growth RIte Rule without Monetary Disturbances 
v�. SO Ron' Dit!' Corr. With ,.' Aoro " SO SO . ,  0 , , 
inv. 3.62 , .(UI 0.09 0.00 0.116 0.08 
1.44 2 -0.116 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.D7 
, 0.60 4 0.00 0.19 -0.10 -0.08 0.05 
w 0.67 3 -O.Q3 0.116 0.00 0.06 0.05 
, 0.56 , ·0.G2 0.00 0.00 0.Q7 0.00 
(3) cr., '" I, cr.y,. "  ·1, 0'," 0.0075 
v�. SO R�' OifT Corr. With ,.' Auto " SO SO ., 0 , , 
in". 3.36 , -0.26 0.07 0 00  0.04 0.116 
1.35 2 -0.09 0.05 0.00· 0.05 0.05 
, 0.57 4 -0.02 0.12 ..().12 ..().14 -0.08 
w 0.63 3 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.04 
, 054 , -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 
(5) a., = I, cr.y,. "  �.5. ex. " -0.5, a, '" 0.i5 
V". SO Ron. Oiff Corr. With ,.' Auto 
% SO SO . ,  0 , , 
in". 3.57 , ..().05 0.01 0.00 om 0.01 
1.42 2 "().Ol 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
, 0.53 " -0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 
w 0.67 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
, 0.56 4' 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
(1) CEE Rule 
V". SO R�' Oiff Corr. With ,.' Auto 
% SO SO . ,  0 , , 
in". 3.62 , 0.00 -0.01 0.00 ..().Ol -0.01 
1.44 2 om -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
, 0.55 " -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 
w 0.68 3 0.00 ..().Ol 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
, 0.56 4' 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
(2) AR-l Rule( a.,-I, a.".o;().42, a,-.007S) 
comp.lrcd to the S.lme model under 
Constant M Growth, without M dist. 
v�. SO Ron. Oit!' Corr. With 
% SO SO . ,  0 
in". 3.62 , 0.06 -0.01 0.00 
1.44 2 0.01 �.Ol 0.00 
, 0.60 4 0.08 -0.10 -0.06 
w 0.67 3 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
, 0.56 , 0.00 -0.01 -om 
(4) cr., - I, ex. -�.9, a." 0.0075 
v�. SO Ron. Oit!' Corr. With 
v, SO SO . ,  0 
in". 3.67 , 0.06 ·0.03 0.00 
1.46 2 0.02 .(J.03 0.00 
, 0.55 " -O.OS -0.03 0.09 
w 0.68 3 0.01 ..().02 0.00 
, 0.57 4' 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(6) SZ Rule 
v�. SO R�' OifT Carr. With 
% SO SO . ,  0 
inv. 3oS3 , -0.08 0.00 0.00 
1.41 2 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
, 0.S3 " -0.06 O.OS 0.03 
w 0." 3 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
, 0.56 4' 0.00 0.00 0.01 
(8) SZ Rule (79:4.) 
v". SO R�k OifT Carr. Wilh 
% SO SO ., 0 
in". 3.42 , .(J.\9 0.00 0.00 
1.38 2 -0.06 0.00 0.00 
, 0.51 " -0.09 0.03 -0.02 
w 0.65 3 ..().03 0.00 0.00 
, 0.55 4' -0.01 0.00 0.00 
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,.' Auto 
, , 
.(l.01 .(l.01 
"().Ol ·0.01 
-0.07 ·0. 1 1  
"().Ol -om 
·0.01 0.00 
, •. Auto 
, , 
-0.02 .(J.O) 
-0.03 .(J.03 
0.09 O.O� 
-0.02 -om 
-0.03 0.00 
,. AUla 
, , 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.02 0.02 
0.00 0.011 
0.01 0.01) 
,. Auto 
, , 
000 O. 
0.00 o.� 
-0.02 O. 
0.00 O. 
0.00 O.� 
fable 9. Changes in Population Moments-Monopolistl� Competition Model, with Price Adjustment 
Cost ( fp = 5 ), �ompared to the AR·I Rule with Monetary Disturban�es 
(I) AR·I Rule (a" .. I , a  .. .. 0.42, 0." .0075 ) 
compared to the RBC model under Constant Money 
Growth Rate Rule wtthout Monetary Disturbances 
�vu SO Rank Oi« COlT. With ". Auto 
" SO SO - , 0 , , 
in". '.n , -0.07 O.IS ..0.01 0.08 0.1 1 
Y l.3S 2 -0. 15  0. 12 0.00 0. 12 0.12 
L 1.)4 , 0.7S 0.04 -0.33 -0.35 -0.07 
W 0.61 , -0.09 0.11 -0.01 0. 1 1 0. 1 1  
C o.so S -0.08 -0.13 -0. 17 0.07 .-(l.0) 
(3) a. - I ,  a". "  ·1, Ok" 0.0075 
vu. SO ""', Oi« Corr. With ,.- Auto 
% SO SO -, 0 , , 
In''. 2.4S , - 1 .27 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 
0.92 2' -0.43 0.04 0.00 004 0.04 
, 1 . 18  " -0.16 -0.14 -0.33 ·0.36 -0.05 
• 0.41 S' -0.20 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.0) 
, 0.43 " -0.07 -0.14 -0.04 0.10 -0.08 
(5) a. - 1, a"." -0.5, a. - ·0.5, o. '"' 0.75 
vu. SO """ Oiff COlT. With " Auto 
" SO SO - , 0 , , 
tn". 2.98 , -0.74 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 
1.17 2 ·0.18 0.03 0_00 0.03 O.Ol 
, 0.92 , ·0.43 0.00 -0.18 -0.22 -0.13 
• 0.54 , -0.07 0.01 0_00 0.03 0.01 
, 0_" S -0.01 O.OS 0.11 0.14 -0.01 
(7) CEE Rule 
vu_ SO ""', Oiff COlT. With ". Auto 
" SO SO -, 0 , , 
in". ).)3 , -0.40 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
1.28 2 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
, 0.99 , -0.36 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -O. IS  
• 0.S9 , -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
, 0.50 S 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.00 
(2) AR·I Ruie( a."I. <It.,-G.42, 0.-.0075) 
�ompared to tbe same model under 
Constant M Growth, without M dist. 
vu. SO R�k OifT COlT. With 
% SO SO - ,  0 
in". '.n , 0.94 -0. 1 1 -0.01 
1.)5 2 0.23 -0.06 0.00 
, 1.)4 , 0.56 -0.08 0.26 
w 0.61 4 0.09 -0.04 0.00 
, o.SO S 0.02 -0.06 -0.15 
(4) <It. - 1, CL,. '" ..0.9, 0." 0.0075 
vu. SO .... Diff COlT. With 
" SO SO -, 0 
in". 3.36 , -0.36 0.00 0.0\ 
1.33 2 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
, 0.74 , -0.60 0.09 0.01 
w 0.62 , 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
, 0.S3 S 0.03 0.1 1  0.16 
(6) SZ Rule 
vu_ SO R�k Oiff ColT. With 
" SO SO -, 0 
in". 3.15 , -O.S7 0.01 0.00 
1 .21 2 -0.14 0.00 0.00 
, 1.00 , -0.34 -0.0) ·0. 1l 
w O SO , .().05 -0.01 0.00 
, 0.49 S -0.01 0.04 0.09 
(8) SZ Rule (79:4-) 
Vu_ SO .... Oitf Corr. With 
" SO SO -, 0 
in". ).01 , .().71 -0.02 0.00 
l.lS 2 -0.20 -0.03 0.00 
, 1.0S , -0.29 -0. 13 -O.IS 
w 0.53 , -0.08 -0_04 0.01 
, 0.48 S -0.02 0.00 0-07 
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" AUlO 
, , 
-0.06 -0.10 
-0.06 -0.06 
0.27 0.12 
-0.07 -0.04 
-O.IS 0.01 
". Auto 
, , 
0.00 0.00 
-0.02 -0.02 
-0.02 -0-14 
-0.01 -0.02 
0_09 0.02 
". Auto 
, , 
-0.01 -0.01 
0.00 0.00 
-0.20 -0.\7 
0.01 0.00 
0.12 -0.01 
". AUlo 
, , 
-O.OS -0.04 
-0.03 -0.0) 
-0.23 -O.1l 
-0.01 -0.03 
0.07 -0.03 
Tlble 10. Chlnges in Population Moments·Monopolistic Competition Model, with Price Adjustment 
Cost (4Ip - 15 ), compared to the AR·I Rule with Monetary Disturbances 
(I) AR·I Rule (a., - I ,a." - 0.42, O"� .. . 0075) 
complred to the RBC model with Coutant Money 
Rate Rule wit bout Monetary Disturb.aca 
Vu. SO R�k Diff Cart. With ..' ,"00 
% SO SO ., 0 , , 
inv. 4.)6 , 0.$6 0.13 ·<>.02 0.09 0.12 
1.31 3 -0.13 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.13 
, 2.10 2 1.51 0.05 -0.23 .0.11 0.04 
w 0.51 4 ·0.12 0.12 ".04 0.01 0.13 
, 0.49 , -0.09 -0.4) ·0.61 .o.3S ·0.06 
(3) a, '" I, a". - -I, a.:: 0.0075 
Vu. SO ""'" Oiff Cort. With ,.' A,oo 
% SO SO ., 0 , , 
inv. 2.02 , -2.34 ".06 .0.10 .0.20 ... . 
0.59 3 -0.71 ".04 0.00 ".04 ".04 
, J.S) 2 -0.57 .0.21 -0.41 .0.47 ..... 
• 0." " -0.33 -0.14 -0.03 0.00 -0." 
, 0." 4' -0.04 -0.16 -0.09 0.Q7 -0." 
(5) a. - 1, a". - -0.5, a,. = ...{l.s, 0-, ... 0.75 
Vu. SO �k Oiff Cart. With ,.' A,IO 
% SO SO . , 0 , , 
inv. 2.49 , ·1.17 0.01 .0.03 -0.11 -O.OS 
0.85 3 .0.52 ·0.02 0.00 -0.02 .0.02 
, 1.43 2 .0.68 ·0.19 .oJ5 ·0.44 .0.12 
• 0.37 " .0.21 -0.06 0.02 0.04 -O.Q3 
, 0.42 " -0.06 .0.02 0.18 OJI -0.07 
(7)CEE Rule 
Vu. SO �k Oif( Cort. Wilh ,. A,IO 
% SO SO . , 0 , , 
inv. 3.33 , ·1.03 -0.04 .0.01 -0.10 -0." 
1.\1 3 -0.26 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 
, 1.63 2 -0.47 -0.13 .0.15 -0.26 -0.12 
• 0.41 , -0.10 -O.Q7 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
, 0.44 , -0.04 0.05 0.11 0.25 -0.04 
(2) AR-I Rule( a., - I,«!o. -=0.42, a,-.007S) 
compared to the s.me model Growth 
with Const. M Growtb, no M dist. 
Vu. SO R�k Oif( COrt. With 
% SO SO . , 0 
inv. 4." , 2.$6 -0.18 0.06 
1.37 3 0.70 -0.10 0.00 
, 2.10 2 0.89 0.25 0." 
w 0.58 4 0.28 -0.01 ·0.02 
, 0.49 , 0.Q7 0.00 -0.)0 
(4) a, -1, a,. - ...{l.9, a. - 0.0075 
Vu. SO �k Oiff Con. With 
% SO SO . , 0 
inv. 3.15 , ·1.21 ·0.01 0.00 
1.14 3 .0.23 -0.04 0.00 
, 1.3) 2 -0.78 -0.12 -0.22 
w 0.51 4 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 
, 0.45 , .0.0) 0.20 0.39 
(6) SZ Rule 
Vu. SO �k Oiff Cart. With 
% SO SO . , 0 
in". 3.01 , ·1.35 -0.03 .0.01 
1.01 3 .0.36 -0.05 0.00 
, 1.$6 2 -0." -0.15 .0.21 
• 0.43 4 -0.14 -0.07 0.02 
, 0.43 4' -O.OS 0.02 0.17 
(8) SZ Rule (79:4-) 
Vu. SO �k Oif( Cart. With 
% SO SO . , 0 
in". 3.09 , ·1.26 -0.10 -0.02 
1.01 3 .0.35 -0.11 0.00 
, 1.6) 2 .0.48 -0.21 -0.21 
w 0.43 " .o.IS -0.12 -0.12 
, O.4S 4' -0.04 .0.02 -0.02 
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,,' AUlo 
, , 
0.06 -0." 
-0.10 -0.10 
0.71 0.13 
.0.17 ·0.04 
-0.50 0.09 
,,' A,IO 
, , J .0.01 -0.06 
-004 -0.04 
-0.36 -0.20 
0.02 -0.04 
0." -0.01 
,.' A,IO 
, , 
.0.11 -0.09 
.0.05 .o.OS 
.oJ4 ·0.14 
0.01 .0.05 
0.28 .o.OS 
,,' AUla 
, , 
.0.16 -0.14 
-0.11 .0.11 
-0.32 .0.14 
-0.0' ·0.10 
0.18 .o.O�; 
Table II. Changes in Population Moments-with Price Adjustment Cost ( .,'" 5) and One-Period 
Nomiflll Wage Contract 
(I) AR-t Rule (Clj, -I , <XiII" 0.41, o. = .0075) 
compared to tbe RBC model under Constant Money 
Growtb Rate Rule witbout Monetlry Disturbances 
Vu. sn R�k Diff Con. With ,. Auto 
% sn sn ., 0 , , 
inv. 4.20 , 0.<0 0.10 ..(J.OI 0.03 0.05 
1.4S , .0.05 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.09 
, 1.68 2 1.09 0.01 -0.26 -0.33 -0.11 
w 0.64 4 .<>.0, 0.08 -0.23 -0.06 -0.06 
, 0.49 , -0.09 -0.19 -0.27 0.00 -0.03 
(3) a." I, a"." -I, 0." 0.0075 
Vu. sn Ruk Diff CorY. With ,.' A",. 
% sn sn ., 0 , , 
!nV . 2.63 , .1.57 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 
0.93 , -O.B 0.06 0.00 0.06 0 06 
, 1.37 2 -0.31 -0.09 -0.30 -0.31 -0.02 
w 0.43 4 -O.lO -0.15 -0.07 0.08 ..(J.15 
, 0.42 , -0.07 -0.17 -0.06 0.10 -0.09 
(5) a ... I, a". .. ",().S, a.. = ..(l.S, 0"." 0.75 
Vu. sn Rmk Diff CorY. With ,.' Auto 
% sn sn ., 0 , , 
"'. 3.26 , -0.93 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 
, 1.21 2' .0.24 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
, 1.21 2 -0.47 -0.03 -0.17 -0.1 7 -0.12 
w 0.55 4 -0.09 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 
, 0.47 , -0.02 0.04 0.13 0.13 -0.02 
(7) CEE Rule 
Vu. sn R�k Diff CorY. With ,. Auto 
" sn sn ., 0 , , 
Inv. 3.77 , -0.42 -0.0) 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 
1.37 2' -0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
, 1.36 " -0.33 -0.07 -0.06 -0.14 ·0.15 
w 0.60 4 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.02 
, 0.49 , 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.00 
(2) AR·I Rule( a." I, a.1E().42, 0.-.0075) 
compared to tbe Slme model under 
Consunt M Growth, without M dist. 
Vu. sn R�k Diff Corr. With 
% sn sn ., 0 
inv. 4.20 , -O.IS -0.18 0.00 
1.45 , -0.11 -0.11 0.00 
, 1.68 2 0.11 -0.06 0.33 
w 0.64 4 -0.07 0.06 -0.29 
, 0.49 , 0.02 -0.08 -0.28 
(4) <XiI -I, a.. "'-0.9, o. - 0.0075 
Vu. sn ""'" Diff Corr. With 
% sn sn ., 0 
inv. 3.71 , -0.49 -0.03 0.01 
1.41 2' ·0.05 -0.04 0.00 
, 1.06 " ·0.62 -0.05 -0.04 
w 0.63 4 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 
, 0.52 , 0 04 0.1l 0.20 
(6) SZ Rule 
VM. sn Ruk Diff COfT. With 
% sn sn ., 0 
inv. 3.49 , -0.70 -0.01 0.00 
1.28 , -0.17 -0.01 0.00 
, 1.31 2 -0.38 -0.07 -0.11 
w 0.57 • -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 
, 0.48 , -0.01 0.04 0. 11 
(8) SZ Rule (79:4-) 
Vu. sn ""'k Diff CorY. With 
" sn sn ., 0 
inv. 3.41 , -0.79 -0.06 0.00 
1.24 , -0.21 -0.06 0.00 
, 1.33 2 -0.35 -0.15 -0.14 
w 0.55 4 -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 
, 0.47 , -0.02 0.00 0.08 
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,.' Auto 
, , 
-0.10 -0.15 
-0.1 J -0.11 
0.33 0.11 
-0.29 -0.07 
-0.28 0 02 
,.' A.<o 
, , 
-0.03 -0 04 
-0.04 ·0.04 
-0.10 -0.21 
0.09 0.09 
0.11 0.02 
,.' Auto 
, , 
-0.04 -0.04 
-0.01 -0.01 
·0.21 -0.18 
0.09 0.00 
0.14 -0.01 
,.' A.," 
, , 
-0.09 -0.09 
-0.06 -0.21 
-0.23 -0.35 
0.01 -0.09 
0.08 .0.02 
Table 12. Nominal Features or Business Cydes (with Monetary Disturban(:es) 
II) U.S. Data 
Period Vnillbles Standnd Deviation % Correlation witb Out •• 
inflalion nom. inl M.,. Inflation Nom. in!. M.,. 
60·96 GNPD,TBR MI 0.30 1.29 0.83 0.15 0.14 ..(l.15 
CPI M2 0.46 0.64 0.40 0.01 
MB 0.45 -0.28 
79:4·96 GNPD, TBR. M I 0.24 1.50 1.10 0.24 0.26 -0.25 
CPI M2 0.47 0.62 0.32 -0.14 
CPI MB 0.54 -0.17 
b) Models 
Model Polky Rule Standud Deviation �. Correllitton witb Out •• 
inflation nom. int M", Inflation Nom. in!. M .  
RBC AR-I 1.31 0.31 0.77 ·0.30 0.29 0.00 
Counter eHeal 2.22 0.13 1.29 ·0.35 1.00 ·0.11 
counter·inflation 0.67 0.07 0.63 -0.31 0.98 OJO 
rounler-cye..t in! 1.16 0.09 0.49 -0.34 0.99 0.00 
SZ 1.23 0.10 0.65 -0.36 0.32 -0.08 
CEE 1.04 0.09 0.64 ·0.31 0.88 0.12 
SZ(79:4· 1.30 OJ6 0.38 ·0.42 ·0.28 -0.17 
NWC·I AR·I 1.06 0.75 0.77 -0.13 0.35 OJ5 
Counter< diul 1.49 1.19 0.88 -0.20 0.23 -0.12 
counter·inflation 0.57 0.16 0.72 -0.21 0.52 0.38 
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Figure1 .  impulse response to monetary policy shocks - RBC Model 
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks - NWC-1 Model 
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Figure 3. Impulse Responses to M Shocks - MC-1 :1 
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Figure 4. Impulse Responses to Prod Shocks :1==""" J -2 
o 5 · 10 1 5  20 
h 
5,,------------------
+++ + + +  +++ +++ 
O�-------====
+
==
+
=
+
==
+:+=+==+= 
o 5 10 1 5  20 
2r-----------------� 
OL-------------�--� 
o 5 1 0  
Y 
1 5  20 
- MC-1 
5,---------------, 
a ++++++++++++++++++ 
v 
_5 '----------------.J 
o 5 1 0  
inf 
1 5  20 
0 5l.:::: -
o 5 1 0  1 5  20 
c 
-1 '----------------' 
o 5 10 
I 
1 5  20 
Dotted line: MC-I under the constant money growth rate rule 
Solid line: MC-l under the feedback rule on the level of output 
'+" line: MC-O under the constant money growth rate rule 
- 48 -
References 
Aiyagari, S. Rao and R. Anton Braun, 1996, Some Explorations into Optimal Cyclical Monetary 
Policy, Working Paper 565, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
Bergin, Paul, 1996, Mundell-Flemming Deconstructed: Reconsidering Policy and Spillovers 
With and Without Wage Contracts, mimeo, Yale University. 
Blanchard, Oliver J., and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, 1987, Monopolistic Competition and the Effecl of 
Aggregate Demand, American Economic Review 77, 647-666. 
Bryant, Ralph C., Peter Hooper, and Catherine L. Mann, 1993, eds. Evaluating Policy Regimes: 
New Research in Empirical Macroeconomics, Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1993. 
Chari, V. V., Lawrence Christiano, and Martin Eichenbaum, 1995, Policy Analysis in Business 
Cycle Models, in Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Thomas F. Cooley (ed.), Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Cho, Jang-Ok and Thomas Cooley, 1995, The Business Cycle with Nominal Contracts, 
&onomie Theory, Vol. 6, No I, 13-33. 
Cho, Jang-Ok and Louis Phaneuf, "A Business cycle Model with Nominal Contracts and 
Government," Institute for Empirical macroeconomics, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Discussion Paper 80, Feb. 1993. 
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 1992, Liquidity Effects and the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism, American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 346-353. 
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 1995, Liquidity Effects, 
Monetary Policy and the Business Cycle, Journal of Money. Credit. and Banking, November, 
Part I, I I  13-6. 
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 1996, The Effects of monetary 
Policy Shocks: Evidence From the Flow of Funds, Review of Economics and Stalislics. 
February Vol. LXXVIlI, 16-34. 
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 19973, Sticky Price and Limited 
Participation Models of Money: A Comparison, European Economic Review 41, 1201-1249. 
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 1997b, Modeling Money, 
presented at the CEPR meeting in January 1997. 
Carlstrom, Charles T. and Timothy S. Fuerst, 1995, Interest Rate Rules vs. Money Growth Rules, 
A Welfare Comparison in a Cash-in�Advance Economy, Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 
247-267. 
-49-
Cooley, Thomas F. and Gary D. Hansen, 1989, The Inflation Tax in a Real Business Cycle 
Model, American Economic Re\liew 79, 733-48. 
Cooley, Thomas F. and Gary D. Hansen, 1995, Money and Business Cycle, in Frontiers of 
Business Cycle Research, Thomas F. Cooley (ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Cooley, Thomas F. and Edward C. Prescott, 1995, Economic Growth and Business Cycles, in 
Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Thomas F. Cooley (ed.), Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ. 
Fuerst, Timothy S., 1 992, liquidity, Loanable Funds, and Real Activity, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 29, 3-24. 
Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. and George R. Moore, 1995, Monetary Policy Trade-offs and the Correlation 
between Nominal Interest Rates and Real Output, American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No.1, 
march. 
Gavin, William T. and Finn E. Kydland, 1996, Endogenous Money Supply and The Business 
Cycle, Research Division Working Papers, 95-01 0C, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Hairault, Jean-Oliver and Franck Portier, 1993. Money, New-Keynesian Macroeconomics and 
the Business Cycle, European Economic Re\liew 37, 1533-1568. 
Kim, Jinill, 1996, Monetary Policy in a Stochastic Equilibrium Model with Real and Nominal 
Rigidities, mimeo, Yale University. 
Kim, Soyoung, 1995, Does Monetary Policy Matter in the G-6 Countries? Using Common 
Identifying Assumptions about Monetary Policy Across Countries. mimeo, Yale University. 
Kim, Soyoung, 1996, Monetary Instrument Problem Revisited by Specifying Appropriate Fiscal 
Policies, mimeo, Yale University. 
Killg, G. Robert, 1992, Money and Business Cycles, mimeo, University of Rochester. 
King, G. Robert, Charles I. Plosser and Sergio T. Rebelo, 1 988, Production, Growth and 
Business Cycles: I. The Basic Neoclassical Model, Journal of Monetary Economics 21, 195-
232. 
King, G. Robert and Mark W. Watson, 1 996, Money. Prices, Interest Rates and the Business 
Cycle, Re\liew of Economics and Statistics, February, Vol. LXXVIII, 35-54. 
Leeper, Eric M., 1991, Equilibria under "Active" and "Passive" Monetary and Fiscal Policies. 
Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129-147. 
Leeper, Eric M., 1993, The Policy Tango: Toward a Holistic View of Monetary and Fiscal 
Effects, Economic Re\liew. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, July/August, 1-27. 
- 50-
Leeper, Eric M. and Christopher A. Sims, 1994, Toward a Modern Macroeconomic Model 
Usable for Policy Analysis, NBER Macroeconomics Annual. 
Leeper, Eric M., Christopher A. Sims, and Tao Zha, 1996, What Does Monetary Policy Do? 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1-63. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., 1990, Liquidity and Interest Rates, Journal of Economic Theory 50, 237-
264. 
Poole, William, 1970, Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instrument in a Simple Stochastic 
Macro Model, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 197-2 16. 
Rotemberg, Julio J. and Michael Woodford, 1995, Dynamic General Equilibrium Mode:s with 
Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets, in Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Thomas F. 
Cooley (ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Rotemherg, Julio J. and Michael Woodford, 1997, An Optimization-Based Econometric 
Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy, mimeo, Princeton University. 
Sargent, TJ. and N. Wallace, 1975, "Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, 
and the Optimal Money Supply Rule, Journal of Political Economy 83, 241-254. 
Sargent, TJ. and N. Wallace, 1 982, The Real-Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A 
Reconsideration, Journal of Political Economy 90, 1212-1236. 
Sims, C.A., 1995, Solving Linear Rational Expectation Models, manuscript, Yale University. 
Sims, Christopher A. and Tao Zha, 1995, Does Monetary Policy Generate Recessions?: Using 
Less Aggregate Price Data to Identify Monetary Policy, mimeo, Yale University. 
Stock, J. and Mark Watson, 1993, A Simple Estimator of Co integrating Vectors in Higher Order 
Cointegrated Systems, Econometrica 6 1 ,  783-820/ 
Taylor, John 8., 1993, Macroeconomic Policy in a World Economy: From Econometric Design 
to Practical Operation, W. W. Norton & Company: New York, London. 
Vun, Tack, Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity, and Business Cycles, Journal of 
Monetary Economics 1 996. 
- 51 -

WORKING PAPERS (1) 
9525 Aurora AJejano y Juan M: Peiialosa: La integraci6n financiera de la economia espanola: 
efectos sobre los mercados financicros y la politica monclaria. 
9526 Ramon Gomez Salvador y Juan J. Dolado: Creaci6n y destrucci6n de emplco en Espana: 
un analisis descriptivQ con datos de la eBBE. 
9527 Santiago Fenuindez de Lis y Javier Santiltan: Regimenes cambiarios e integraci6n moneta· 
ria en Europa. 
9528 Gabriel Quiros: Mercados financieros alemanes. 
9529 Juan Aruso Huertas: Is there a trade-off between exchange rate risk and interest rate risk? 
(The Spanish origioal of this publication has the same number.) 
9530 Fernando Resto)'! Determinantes de la curva de rendimientos: hip6tesis expectacional y 
primas de riesgo. 
9531 Juan Ayuso and Maria Perez Jurado: Devaluations and depreciation expectations in the EMS. 
9532 Paul Sdtulstad and Angel Senat: An Empirical Examination of a Multilateral Target Zone 
Model. 
9601 Juan Ayuso, Soledad N6iiez and Maria Perez.Jurado: Volatility in Spanish financial market ... : 
The recent experience. 
9602 Javier Andres e Ignacio Hernando: tC6mo afecta la inflaci6n al crecimiento econ6mico? 
Evidencia para los paises de la OCDE. 
9603 Barbara Dluhosch: On the fate of newcomers in the European Union: Lessons from the 
Spanish experience. 
9604 Santiago Fenuindez de Lis: Oassifications of Central Banks by Autonomy: A comparative 
analysis. 
9605 M.I Cruz Manzano Frias y Sofia Galmes Belmonte: Credit Institutions' Price Policies and 
Type of Customer: Impact on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism. (The Spanish 
original of this publication has the same number.) 
9606 Malte KrUger: Speculation, Hedging and Intermediation in the Foreign Exchange Market. 
9607 Agustin MaravalI: Short-Term Analysis of Macroeconomic Time Series. 
9608 Agustin Marava)) and Christophe Planas: Estimation Error and the Specification of Un­
observed Component Models. 
9609 Agustin Maravall: Unobserved Components in Economic Time Series. 
9610 Matthew B. Camoneri, Behzad Diba and Gwen Eadey: Trends in European Productivity 
and Real Exchange Rates. 
9611 Francisco Alonso, Jorge Martinez Pages y Maria Perez Jurado: Weighted Monetary 
Aggregates: an Empirical Approach. (The Spanish original of this publication has the same 
number.) 
9612 Agustin Maravall and Daniel Pena: Missing Observations and Additive Outliers in Time 
Series Models. 
9613 Juan Ayuso and Juan L. Vega: An empirical analysis of the peseta's exchange rate dynami(:s. 
9614 Juan Ayuso Huertas: Un ancllisis empirico de los tipos de interes reales ex-ante en Espana. 
9615 Enrique Alberola I1a: Optimal exchange rate targets and macroeconomic stabilization. 
9616 A. Jorge Padilla, Samuel Bentolila and Juan J. Dolado: Wage bargaining in industries with 
market power. 
9617 Juan J. Dolado and Francese: Mannol: Efficient estimation of cointegrating relationships 
among higher order and fractionally integrated processes. 
9618 Juan J. Dolado y RamOn G6mez: La relaci6n entre vacantes y desempJeo en Espana: per­
turbaciones agregadas y de reasignaci6n. 
9619 Alberto Cabrero and Juan Carlos Delrieu: Construction of a composite indicator for predicting 
inflation in Spain. (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.) 
9620 Una-Louise Bell: Adjustment costs, uncertainty and employment inertia. 
9621 M.- de los Uanos Matea y Ana Valentina RegiI: Indicadores de inflaci6n a corto plazo. 
9622 James Conklin: Computing value correspondences for repeated games with state variables. 
9623 James CoaJdin: The theory of sovereign debt and Spain under Philip II. 
9624 Jose Vliials and Juan F. Jimeno: Monetary Union and European unemployment. 
9625 Maria JesUs Nieto Carol: Central and Eastern European Financial Systems: Towards inte­
gration in the European Union. 
9626 Mattbew B. Canzoneri, Javier Valles and Jose VliiaIs: Do exchange rates move to address 
international macroeconomic imbalances? 
9627 Enrique Alberola Ua: Integraci6n econ6mica y uni6n monetaria: el contraste entre Nor­
teamerica y Europa. 
9628 Victor G6mez and Agustin Manvall: Programs TRAMO and SEATS. 
9629 Javier Andres, Ricardo Mestre y Javier Valles: Un modelo estructural para el analisis del 
mecanismo de transrnisi6n monetaria: el caso espano!. 
9630 Francisco Alonso y Juan Ayuso: Una estimaci6n de las primas de riesgo por inflaci6n en el 
caso espano!. 
9631 Javier Santilbin: Politica cambiaria y autonomia del Banco Central. 
9632 Marcial Suhez: Vocabula (Notas sobre usos lingilis�icos). 
9633 Juan Ayuso and J. David L6pez-Salido: What does consumption tell us about inflation 
expectations and real interest rates? 
9701 Victor G6mez, Agustin Maravall and Daniel Peiia: Missing observations in ARIMA mo-
dels: Skipping strategy versus outlier approach. 
9702 Jose Ran6n Martinez Resano: Los contratos DIFF y el tipo de cambio. 
9703 Gabriel Quiros Romero: Una valoraci6n comparativa del mercado espanol de deuda publica. 
9704 Agustin Maravall: 1\vo discussions on new seasonal adjustment methods. 
9705 J. David LOpez-Saiido y Pilar Velilla: La dinamica de los margenes en Espana (Una primera 
aproximaci6n con datos agregados). 
9706 Javier Andres and Ignado Hernando: Does inflation harm economic growth? Evidence for 
the OECD. 
9707 Marga Peeters: Does demand and price uncertainty arrect Belgian and Spanish corporate 
investment? 
9708 Jeffrey Franks: Labor market policies and unemployment dynamics in Spain. 
9709 Jose RamOn Martinez Resano: Los mercados de derivados y el euro. 
9710 Juan Ayuso and J. David LOpez-Salido: Are ex-post real interest rates a good proxy for 
ex-ante real rates? An international comparison within a CCAPM framework. 
9711 Ana Buislin Y Miguel Perez: Un indicador de gasto en construcci6n para la economfa espanolu. 
9712 Juan J. Dolado, J. David LOpez-Saiido and Juan Luis Vega: Spanish unemployment and in­
flation persistence: Are there phillips trade-orrs? 
9713 Jose M. Gonzalez Minguez: The balance-sheet transmission channel of monetary policy: 
The cases of Gennany and Spain. 
9714 Olympia Bonr: Cambios en la composici6n del empleo y actlvidad laboral femenina. 
9715 Francisco de Castro and Alfonso Novales: The joint dynamics of spot and forward exchanf,e 
rates. 
9716 Juan Carlos Caballero, Jorge Martinez y M.- Teresa Sastre: La utilizaci6n de los indices de 
condiciones monetarias desde la perspectiva de un banco central. 
9717 Jose ViDaIs Y Juan E Jimeno: EI mercado de trabajo espanol y la Uni6n Econ6mica y Mo­
netaria Europea. 
9718 Samuel Bentolila: La inmovilidad del trabajo en las regiones espanolas. 
9719 Enrique Alberola, Juan Ayuso and J. David L6pez-Salido: When may peseta depreciations 
fuel inflation? 
9720 Jose M. Gonzalez Minguez: The back calculation of nominal historical series after the intro­
duction of the european currency (An application to the GOP). 
9721 Una-Louise Bell: A Comparative Analysis of the Aggregate Matching Process in France, 
Great Britain and Spain. 
9722 Francisco Alonso Sanchez, Juan Ayuso Huertas y Jorge Martinez Pages: El poder predictivo 
de los tipos de inten!s sobre la tasa de inflaci6n espanola. 
9723 Isabel Argim6n, Concha Artola y Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo: Empresa publica y em­
presa privada: titularidad y eficiencia relativa. 
9724 Enrique Alberola and Pierfederico AsclrubaJi: How do countries smooth regional disturban­
ces? Risksharing in Spain: 1973-1993. 
9725 Enrique Alberola, Jose Manuel Marques and Alicia Sanchis: Unemployment persistence, 
Central Bank independence and inflation perfonnance in the OECO countries. (The Spa­
nish original of this publication has the same number.) 
9726 Francisco Alonso, Juan Ayuso and Jorge Martinez Pages: How informative are financial ClS­
set prices in Spain? 
9727 Javier Andres, Ricardo Mestre and Javier Valles: Monetary policy and exchange rate dyna­
mics in the Spanish economy. 
9728 Juan J. Dolado, Jose M. Gonz8lez-Paramo y Jose Vm.a1s: A cost-benefit analysis of going 
from low inflation to price stability in Spain. 
9801 Angel Estrada, Pilar Garcia Perea, Alberto Urtasun y JesUs Briones: lndicadores de pre­
cios, costes y margenes en las diversas ramas productivas. 
9802 Pilar Alvarez Canal: Evoluci6n de la banca extranjera en el perioclo 1992-1996. 
9803 Angel Estrada y Alberto Urtasun: Cuantificaci6n de expectativas a partir de las encuestas 
de opini6n. 
9804 Soyoung Kim: Monetary Policy Rules and Business Cycles. 
(1) Previously published Working Papen are listed in the Banco de Espana publications catalogue. 
Queries should be addressed to: Banco de Espana 
Secci6n de Publicaciones. Negociado de Distribuci6n y Gesti6n 
Telephone: 338 51 80 
Alcala. SO. 28014 Madrid 
